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THE WAR OF 1812, SEPTEMBER 11TH, AND THE
POLITICS OF COMPENSATION
Michele Landis Dauber*
The sufferers too well remember, the toilsome days and sleepless
nights of December, 1813 and January, 1814; and while they remember the want of governmental protection, the smoking ruins, the
devastation and the sufferings, they will burn with indignation, not
to be quenched, until that government, (who denied them protection, in the hour of danger, and who now actually turns a deaf ear to
their petitions,) shall amply remunerate their losses, by a prompt
and honorable liquidation of their claims.
Editorial, Buffalo Gazette, 18171
INTRODUCTION

"Unprecedented" is perhaps the most frequent characterization of
the federal government's response in compensating victims of the attacks of September 11th. 2 Kenneth Feinberg, the administrator of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (VCF), has often
described the Fund as without parallel in American history.3 This
*

Assistant Professor of Law and (by courtesy) Sociology, Stanford University. I would like

to thank Ariceli Campos, Ken Dauber, Mary Dudziak, Kenneth Feinberg, Barbara Fried, Lawrence Friedman, Tom Grey, Deborah Hensler, Mark Kelman, Paul Lomio, Michael Meuti, Alan
Morrison, Sonia Moss, Bob Nelson, Bill Novak, Martha Nussbaum, Claire Priest, Bob Rabin,
Peter Schuck, Art Stinchcombe, Gabriel Tames, Chris Tomlins, Erika Wayne, John Witt, as well
as all of the participants in the 2003 Clifford Symposium and the 2003 Levi Leadership Symposium for their helpful comments and assistance. I am particularly grateful to Archivist John
Vandereedt and the research staff at the National Archives and Records Administration for
assistance with the papers of the Third Auditor of the Treasury Department and the R.B. Lee
Commission.
1. Smith Salisbury, Niagara Frontier Claims, BUFF. GAZETTE, Jan. 28, 1817, at 3.
2. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix & Kristin B. Stewart, The September lth Victim Compensation
Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 123, 126
(2002); Robert L. Rabin, IndeterminateFuture Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1831, 1832 (2002) (calling the fund "truly unprecedented"); Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudenceof Injury, 36 IND. L. REV. 237, 243 (2003)
(quoting Kenneth Feinberg calling the Fund "unprecedented"); Larry S. Stewart et al., The September I I Victim Compensation Fund: Past or Prologue?,9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 155 (2002); Lisa
Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92; David Savage, An Unprecedented Gesture: Experts Praise U.S. Compensation Plan, NEWSDAY, Oct 7, 1991, at A46.

3.

KENNETH FEINBERG, COMPENSATION FOR DECEASED VICTIMS,

available at http://www.us-

doj.gov/victimcompensation/comp-deceased.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003) (process is "unprecedented"); KENNETH FEINBERG, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEMBER 22, 2003 CLAIM
SUBMISSION DEADLINE, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/policy-statement.
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might be true in some respects, such as the statutory definition of loss
that includes "hedonic damages ' 4 or the potential size of some individual awards. In other significant respects, however, the VCF is anything but unprecedented. As I have elsewhere shown, 5 the federal
government has been involved in compensating the victims of calamities of various kinds, including victims of what we now call "terrorism," since the earliest days of the Republic. Here, I turn to one such
event and examine in more detail the commission established to compensate victims of the War of 1812. I am interested in this case for its
comparative value, as the similarities between the experiences of 1812
and of 2001 can sharpen our understanding of the politics of disaster
relief more generally. I argue, in brief, that in the political hazards
faced by relief administrators in these two cases we can see displayed,
not only the moral logic of disaster relief, but also that of its closely
allied cousin, the welfare state.
The political aftermaths of the War of 1812 and the attacks of September 11th are far more similar than the events themselves. In both
cases, victims portrayed the government as partially culpable-and
thus liable-for failing to defend an innocent civilian population
against terrorist attacks, as Smith Salisbury, publisher of the Buffalo
Gazette, argued in the editorial providing the epigraph above. In both
cases, Congress hastily enacted a vaguely worded statute calling for
the appointment of a special commissioner who was granted broad
and unreviewable authority to distribute federal compensation. This
pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2003) ("I continue to believe that the September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 expresses the unprecedented compassion and generosity of the American
people."); Sept. llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)). See generally Lena Sun & Jaqueline Salmon, Sept. 11 Funds
Wrestle with What's Fair: Disparities Pit Survivor Groups Against Each Other, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 2001, at Al.
4. September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 237.
While the language of "hedonic damage" has raised expectations (and eyebrows), it should be
remembered that the VCF is not the only government compensation for intangible harms. For
example, unallocated lump sum payments to the "downwinders" (at least those who are not sick
and not going to get sick) pay in part for the psychic harm of contamination. Similarly, payments
to ethnically Japanese (at least those who did not own property that was confiscated or lost) who
were interned during World War II are arguably intended to compensate for the emotional distress caused by the relocation and imprisonment.
5. See Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried by Fire,'": Disaster Relief and the
Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 967 (1998) [hereinafter
Landis, "Tried by Fire"]; Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and "Natural" Disaster Relief:
Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & Soc'y REV. 257 (1999) [hereinafter Landis,
"Natural" Disaster Relief]; Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State 23 L. & HIST. REV.
(forthcoming 2005); Michele Landis Dauber, Helping Ourselves: Disaster Relief and the Origins
of the American Welfare State (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author).
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Figure 1: September 1lth Relief
Commissioner Kenneth Feinberg

Figure 2: War of 1812 Relief
Commissioner Richard Bland Lee

authority included promulgating and publishing regulations interpreting the statute, establishing eligibility criteria and rules, receiving
claims for a defined period of two years, hearing evidence, and determining the amount of aid that would be paid to claimants. And in
both cases, the inclusiveness and generosity of the compensation, as
well as the conduct of the commissioner himself, became hotly contested political issues.
My key conclusion is that there is a contradiction at the heart of the
process of distributing compensation: Being deserving of aid demands
a moral innocence born of blameless victimization; yet anticipating or
receiving compensation implies a moral stain, a self-regard that properly requires policing and skepticism. In the very process of distributing aid are the seeds of its unpopularity, or to use a more loaded term,
its delegitimation. Victims of calamity are turned into recipients of
public funds, a category that is, in the American context, one of degradation and suspicion.
This is both a financial transaction and an identity transformation,
as successful claimants are enriched and then stigmatized by their enrichment. Claimants move from a morally exalted status, that of
blameless victim, to a morally suspect one, that of clamorer for aid.
This transformation is difficult, probably impossible, to avoid. It
poses for participants in the relief process, from claimants to commissioners to bureaucrats, peculiar yet typical problems of identity management as they trace the arc from event to compensation.
In treating the relief process in terms of identity, I am drawing on
sociological work on the management of spoiled identities, and in particular, on Erving Goffman's analysis in Stigma.6 Goffman defined a
6.

ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY

(1963).
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stigma as "an attribute that is deeply discrediting."'7 In the American
context, being a recipient of public funds for relief is such an attribute,
as welfare recipients have discovered to their peril. Importantly,
Goffman distinguished between two sorts of stigmatized persons, the
discredited and the discreditable. The discredited are those for whom
their stigma is worn on their sleeve, so to speak. Their problem is
managing an already-spoiled identity, so as to avoid expulsion and social death. The discreditable are those who have an attribute that, if
known, would move them into the ranks of the discredited. Their special anxiety is how to keep from being found out, to "pass" as normal,
and their characteristic preoccupation is how to shape others' perception of them so as to deflect attention from their stigmatizing features.
The situation of the discreditable is precisely that of the claimant for
relief. They are the most blameless, and hence most virtuous and deserving of aid in the immediate aftermath of the event. As time passes
and the victimizing event recedes into the past, it becomes ever harder
for victims to maintain an unadulterated connection to it. With each
passing day, successful claimants are closer to the payoff, making
them increasingly likely to be identified with self-interest and greed
rather than blameless loss. In Goffman's terms, claimants acquire a
stigma-the stain of being a recipient-that can spoil their identity.
Ironically, this stigma can operate to reduce or even eliminate claimants' access to compensation, although the status of rebuffed claimant
is, if anything, even more discrediting than if they had actually received the funds.
For Goffman, stigmatization is contextual, arising out of a particular
configuration of attributes and social expectations. Therefore, it is
possible that a characteristic that is stigmatizing in one context is not
stigmatizing in another, although Goffman asserts that there are attributes that are discrediting nearly everywhere in our society.8 My
argument is that being the recipient of government relief is just such a
universally discrediting attribute, a stigmatizing fact that is only normative in the particular context of disastrous loss. As the moment of
loss recedes-in time, public attention, and in its effects on claimants-the power of the calamity to protect recipients from moral suspicion recedes as well. From this perspective, we can see the effects of
stigmatization on individual claimants as the micro-level reflection of
the contradiction between sympathy and suspicion that characterizes
the American welfare state.
7. Id. at 2.
8. See id. at 4.
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A clear sign of this contradiction is the emergence of a range of
political and bureaucratic moves intended to guard against the nowapparent self-interest of the claimants. When relieving innocent victims, Congress generally establishes only a minimal bureaucratic apparatus charged with the imperative to distribute as much cash as
possible as fast as possible, and empowered to make exceptions to
rules of evidence, means tests, and other standards in order to meet
the particular needs of claimants. By contrast, vetting the claims of
recipients is a far stickier business, rife with suspicion, indifference,
and severe problems of moral hazard and dependency. The government consigns these "cases" (for they are by this time cases and not
individuals) to a much thicker bureaucracy, employing rigidly standardized rules to protect both the public fisc and the public morals
from self-interested recipients who engage in "fraud, forgery, and perhaps perjury," as an 1818 congressional committee report chastised
the Buffalo claimants. 9
The commission charged with assessing claims and distributing relief after the War of 1812 is by now almost wholly forgotten, but a
close analysis of its purpose and history with Goffman's analysis in
mind will prove instructive in understanding the probable future of
the September 11th commission. The congressional attack on the Niagara frontier claimants and the Lee Commission illustrate the linked
processes of disaster relief and identity spoiling, and provide us with a
framework for understanding contemporary political disputes over the
VCF and over the welfare state more broadly.
II.

DISASTER RELIEF AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1 0

Notwithstanding repeated claims that the VCF is "unprecedented"
in American history, direct payments from the federal treasury to relieve "sufferers" from various attacks and calamities began soon after
the inception of the Republic in 1790. These payments began as a
series of private bills for the relief of individuals, and gave way by
1822 to general relief bills benefiting a statutorily defined class of
claimants. By the time that Congress appropriated direct relief following a devastating 1827 fire in Alexandria, Virginia, it had already
granted dozens of separate claims for relief, encompassing thousands
of claimants and millions of dollars, following such events as the Whiskey Rebellion, the slave insurrection on St. Domingo (Haiti), and numerous floods, fires, storms, and earthquakes. Somewhat surprisingly
9. 36

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:

CLAIMS

590 (1818).

10. Landis, "Natural" Disaster Relief supra note 5, at 264-72.
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from our post-New Deal vantage, direct federal relief for the blameless victims of catastrophic events was viewed by nearly everyone in
the nineteenth century-Federalists, Whigs, Jeffersonians, Democrats,
Republicans-as constitutionally unproblematic, often under a broad
reading of the General Welfare Clause. 1
These early appropriations quickly hardened into a set of legislative
precedents that were repeatedly invoked both for and against proposed relief measures. In this respect, Congress often acted more like
a court than a legislature, with Representatives and Senators arguing
that the government was constrained to either grant relief or deny it
by the force of its prior decisions. Successful appeals described events
in what became a standard narrative form: individual claimants had
experienced sudden, unforeseeable calamities for which they were
blameless, and which implicated the federal government. Conversely,
opponents attempted to distinguish claims from prior appropriations
by arguing that in the case at hand the petitioner was responsible for
his own plight. Ultimately, whether or not an event was a "calamity"
deserving of federal intervention turned upon the ability of the claimants to argue that they were innocent victims of fate rather than the
agents of their own misfortune.
I have detailed elsewhere the history of these appropriations, 12 as
well as the use of this history by the architects of the New Deal as the
explicit constitutional and political precedent for their relief and social
security programs. 13 But this history served as an organizational precedent as well. Beginning in 1794 after the Whiskey Rebellion, relief
funds were most often distributed through a centralized federal compensation bureaucracy headed by a commissioner who was appointed
by the executive branch. Congress created these bureaus with broad
discretion to evaluate applications, take evidence, and distribute benefits according to statutory eligibility criteria. The Claims Commission
following the War of 1812 was one of the earliest such endeavors.
Ill.

RICHARD BLAND LEE AND THE CLAIMS COMMISSION

On April 27, 1816, Richard Bland Lee sat in his Alexandria
townhouse and wrote a letter to his old friend James Madison, who
was then President of the United States, asking for a job. Lee was a
highly regarded moderate Federalist who had served in Congress from
1789 to 1795 with the Republican James Madison. The two had re11. See Landis Dauber, Sympathetic State, supra note 5; Landis Dauber, Helping Ourselves,
supra note 5, at 83-90.
12. Landis, "Tried by Fire," supra note 5, at 967.
13. Landis, "Natural" Disaster Relief, supra note 5; Landis Dauber, supra note 5.
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mained close over the intervening years despite their political differences,' 4 a relationship aided by the fact that Lee's wife Eliza was a
close childhood friend of Dolly Todd Madison. The Lees were frequent visitors to the Madison White House. 15 Lee, the third son of

Henry II and Lucy Grimes Lee of Leesylvania, Virginia, had followed
his father, his uncle Richard Lee, his older brothers, the Revolution-

ary War hero (and father of Robert E. Lee) Harry "Light Horse" Lee,
and Attorney General Charles Lee, into politics. 16 Richard Bland Lee
was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784 at the age of
twenty-three, and then was elected to the first Congress with the support of his lifelong patron, George Washington. 17 In Congress, Lee
attained minor fame when he provided a crucial southern vote for

Hamilton's plan for the assumption of Revolutionary War debt by the

new federal government. t 8 In exchange, Hamilton produced enough

northern votes to locate the national capital on the Potomac.
The April 27 letter to Madison was actually the third time Lee had
asked his old friend for a favor. Despite his impeccable social and
political pedigree, Lee had suffered a number of reverses and financial

setbacks throughout his life. The setbacks were due in part to changing political alignments in the South that turned Federalists out of office in favor of Jeffersonians, 19 and also to his efforts to bail out his

brother, Light Horse Harry, from the consequences of Harry's many
14. Clarisa Fleming, Richard Bland Lee, Statesman and Master of Sully 27 (1964) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and available from the Virginia Historical Society); William C. di Giacomantonio, Richard Bland Lee, in 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 388, 389

(John Arthur Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
15. Fleming, supra note 14, at 27.
16. Id. at 13, 15, 19; Eleanor Lee Templeman & Ludwell Lee Montague, Sully: The Home of
Richard Bland Lee, VA. CAVALCADE, Autumn 1970, at 26. The members of Richard Bland
Lee's branch of the Lee family were ardent Federalists, though other branches of the Lee family
were Jeffersonian Republicans. Charles Lee was Attorney General during both the Washington
and Adams administrations. Fleming, supra note 14, at 19.
17. Templeman & Montague, supra note 16, at 26-27; Ludwell Lee Montague, Richard Bland
Lee of Sully, Address at the Fairfax County Historical Society 114, 115 (June 14, 1970) (transcript on file with author and available at the Virginia Historical Society). Washington and his
wife, Martha, were guests at the christening of Lee's first child, Richard Bland Lee II, and were
named as his godparents. Fleming, supra note 14, at 22.
18. Fleming, supra note 14, at 17-19; Montague, supra note 17, at 115. Southern states, such as
Virginia, had opposed Hamilton's assumption plan because they had paid off their debts with
western land grants and didn't want to be taxed by the national government to pay off the debts
of states that had no land to give away.
19. Despite the fact that Madison and Jefferson tried to cultivate Lee's support for their new
party, Lee stood by his patron Washington and supported Jay's Treaty. The Jeffersonians denounced him and targeted him for defeat in 1795, when he lost reelection to Congress. Templeman & Montague, supra note 16, at 32; Fleming, supra note 14, at 24.
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land and financial speculations. 20 In January 1812, Lee first wrote to
Madison seeking an appointment, attributing his state of penury to his
history of "unprofitable public employments." He did admit, in a reference to his brother, that he had "suffered some heavy injuries of
fortune from the failure of others," and promised that if he were rewarded with an appointment of some kind, "I can only promise fidelity and strict attention to my duty and will endeavor to do ample
justice to your confidence." Madison failed to deliver the job, and
Lee eventually was forced by financial setbacks to sell his estate, Sully,
to a cousin in order to get out of debt.
Lee moved his family to Alexandria, where he threw himself on the
mercy of his old friend for a second time. 21 In 1815, after peace with
the British was achieved, Lee again begged Madison for a public job,
admitting that he had been ruined by Harry's indiscretions. "Should
the President hear unfavorable opinions about him, Richard asked for
the privilege of a rebuttal," and pledged to devote all his time to any
appointment. 22 This time, Madison came through for his friend and
appointed Lee to be one of three commissioners charged with the restoration of Washington, D.C., which had been burned by the British
the previous year. 23 That commission had concluded its work in
March 1816, and by April 27 Lee was again unemployed in desperate
financial straits.
As luck would have it, just two weeks earlier, on April 9, 1816, in
response to widespread agitation over the costs of what was increasingly seen by the electorate as a pointless and humiliating war, Con24
gress had overwhelmingly passed a remarkable compensation law.
20. Richard was the only member of the Lee family who remained loyal to Harry, who was
described by one biographer as a compulsive gambler with a seriously defective personality.
Harry defrauded numerous friends, relatives, and associates, including Washington, and was
eventually incarcerated for debt from 1809-10. PAUL C. NAGEL, THE LEES OF VIRGINIA: SEVEN
GENERATIONS OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY 165-80 (1990); Montague, supra note 17, at 117-18.
21. NAGEL, supra note 20, at 185-86.
22. Id. at 186.
23. See Montague, supra note 17, at 118; Templeman & Montague, supra note 16, at 32; Fleming, supra note 14, at 27-28.
24. The vote in the House was 113-15. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 410 (1815). It is interesting to
note that the Act of April 9 compensating civilian losses was passed at the same time that Congress considered and refused to pass a selective entitlement of land grants to regular army officers who had served in the war. See LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 150-64 (2003). Jensen suggests that the bill failed due to the
elitism of this proposed benefit (which would have excluded enlisted soldiers and members of
the militia). The refusal of Congress to enact the officers' benefit while simultaneously compensating civilian losses could also have reflected widespread disgust with the military's often incompetent prosecution of the war. Many people blamed the officer corps, which was widely viewed
as a haven for cowards, drunkards, and incompents, as responsible for the devastation on the
frontier and elsewhere. See ELTING, infra note 34, at 4-6.
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Entitled "An Act to authorize the payment for property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy, while in the military service of the
United States, and for Other Purposes," the law was breathtakingly
broad in scope. 2 5 It provided that the federal government would compensate the loss of various kinds of property lost by civilians in the
war, ranging from horses killed while in government custody, to carts,
boats, and sleighs lost in military service. But the real meat of the Act
of April 9, as it came to be called, was section 9, which provided that
the government would reimburse a civilian for the "destruction of his
or her house or building by the enemy, while the same was occupied
as a military deposite, under the authority of an officer or agent of the
'2 6
United States."
25. An Act to Authorize the Payment for Property Lost, Captured, or Destroyed by the Enemy, While in the Military Service of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 40, § 9, 3
Stat. 261 (1816) [hereinafter Act of April 9]. No relief bill of this scope or administrative complexity had ever been passed by Congress. Although, as discussed above, the federal government had compensated property owners following the Whiskey Rebellion, the number of
claimants in that case was miniscule compared to that contemplated by the Act of April 9. No
such effort was made following the Revolutionary War, a point made by Virginia Republican
(and future Supreme Court Justice) Philip Barbour during the 1817 debate over the repeal of
section 9. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 429 (1817); see also Congress, House of Representatives, Thursday, January 9, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 1817, at 2 (reporting Rep. Reynolds statement
that "he could not see thousands of the public money squandered on the claims now provided
for, when there were so many cases of suffering of the revolutionary war unrelieved, and which
had been rejected by this House"); Zanesville Mess, Letter to the Editor, The Soldiers of the
Revolution, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 20, 1817, at 3 (arguing that Congress should compensate
the soldiers and officers of the Revolutionary War before it aided those of the War of 1812).
26. Act of April 9, supra note 25, § 9. The language of section 9 could be seen as suggestive of
a rationale for compensation similar to that of a "takings" claim in which the government compensates a citizen for the destruction or seizure of private property for public purposes. However, the debate over the repeal of section 9 clearly rejects any notion that the nation was
obligated to pay these claims and reiterates that Congress' purpose was expressly charitable.
Henry Clay, one of the law's staunchest supporters, asserted that beneficence would foster feelings of loyalty to the government among the polity, but admitted that it should be limited by the
"national ability to pay," so that if a future injury was devastating the nation should not indemnify the citizens. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 3931(1816). Virginia Republican (and future House
Speaker and Supreme Court Justice) Philip Barbour argued that although the law sprang from
"a noble generosity of heart" on the part of Congress, he opposed it because he feared setting a
precedent that could threaten the solvency of the nation in the event of a future, larger war. 30
ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1817). Likewise, John Calhoun, an opponent of the Act, noted that
such a precedent would bankrupt the country in the event of a future war. Id. at 391. There was
apparently no stomach among members of either party in Congress for setting the precedent
that a legal (as opposed to moral) debt was owed to all citizens whose property was destroyed
during wartime. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the debate over the Act of April 9
is the entire absence of any constitutional argument-neither for nor against-in the debate
over the propriety of compensating private losses following the war. Calhoun, reputed to be one
of the great strict constructionists of the early Republic, spoke at length against the law as a
matter of administration (he favored leaving the power to adjudicate claims with Congress
rather than delegating it to an administrator) and expediency (he fretted that the law was "destroying the distinction between public and private property" and making the national fisc into

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:289

"[F]or the more speedy execution" of the compensation Act, the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate was to appoint a
commissioner for a two-year term, at an annual salary of $2,000,
"whose duty it shall be to decide upon all cases arising under this
Act."' 27 Upon taking an oath of office, the commissioner of claims was
directed to appoint a clerk and
to proceed with all practicable despatch, to establish, under the direction of the President of the United States such rules, as well in
regard to the receipt of applications of claimants to compensation
for losses provided for by this act, as the species and degree of evidence, the manner in which such evidence shall be taken and authenticated, as shall, in his opinion, be the best calculated to attain
the objects of this act; paying a due regard, in the establishment of
such regulations, as well to the claims of individual justice as to the
interest of the United States[:] which rules and regulations shall,
upon his adoption, be published for eight weeks successively, in the
territories in which the laws of
newspapers in the several states and
28
the United States are published.
None of the crucial terms of section 9-deposite, occupation, authority, officer, agent-were defined in the statute; their construction
was left to the commissioner's regulations. For claims exceeding $200,
the commissioner was to appoint "discreet commissioners" (respected
members of the community, usually justices of the peace or other officials) in the area where the witnesses resided to collect evidence and
send it back to the commissioner for his consideration. After a decision on a claim was reached, the commissioner's clerk was to enter the
adjudications of all claims in a book. No provision was made for appeal; the commissioner's discretion was to be final and unreviewable. 29 Claims would be accepted under the Act for a period of two
30
years.
"universal insurers" of potentially bankrupting future losses). Sketch of a Debate in the House of
Representatives on Monday December 30, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 1, 1817, at 2. But Calhoun
raised no constitutional objection that the payments fell outside the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, nor did he or anyone else suggest that compensation for losses in war could be
constitutionally required under the Takings Clause. For more on the negligible role of the Constitution in 18th and 19th Century federal disaster relief, see Landis Dauber, Helping Ourselves,
supra note 5, at ch. 2-3.
27. Act of April 9, supra note 25, § 11.
28. Id. §§ 11-12.
29. Id. §§ 9, 14. The unreviewability of the commissioner's determinations became a
flashpoint in subsequent congressional debate over the amendment or repeal of the Act. See
Congressional: House of Representatives. Friday, December 13, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16,
1816, at 2 (reporting the argument of Rep. Forsyth that decisions under the Act should be suspended because the commissioner was interpreting the law too broadly and there was no "appellate jurisdiction" over his decisions").
30. Act of April 9, supra note 25, § 15.
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Lee, desperate for the job, carefully crafted his appeal to Madison.
He first expressed his gratitude for the appointment to the D.C. commission, where he had "faithfully assiduously and I trust not
unusefully devoted myself" to the job, and had worked in "perfect
harmony" with his two co-commissioners. In terms best described as
cringing, he extolled his qualifications for the appointment and his
personal honesty and integrity (as distinguished from that of his notorious brother), writing that he was "confident that [no objections] applying to my honesty and fidelity in the execution of any trust
' 31
confided to me can be supported."
Lee was the right man at the right time. Madison was likely quite
eager to appoint a Federalist rather than a member of his own party to
the post in order to deflect opposition to the Act and to his policies
among Federalists in Congress. In Lee he had a well-known member
of the opposition who was also a trusted friend. Lee sent his letter on
Saturday, April 27. By Monday, April 29, Madison had appointed
Richard Bland Lee Commissioner of Claims and had sent his nomination over to the Senate for confirmation. 32 On May 6, Lee wrote to
Madison profusely thanking him for the position and promising that
33
he would shortly confer with the President regarding the regulations.
A.

Mr. Madison's War

In order to understand the Act of April 9 and the complicated (albeit salaried) position in which Richard Bland Lee found himself on
May 6, 1816, it is useful to briefly examine the history of the War of
1812, which commentators have described as America's most obscure
and least understood war.34 Madison declared war on England on
June 8, 1812, ostensibly over English trade restrictions imposed on the
United States, including the British policy of impressments of Ameri31. Letter from Richard Bland Lee (RBL) to James Madison (May 6, 1816), in University of
Virginia Library, Collection No. 3684, boxed with 10547, box No. 5, Richard Bland Lee Letters
folder.
32. 3 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 53 (Apr. 30, 1816).

33. Id.
34. DONALD GRAVES, WHERE RIGHT AND GLORY LEAD (2d ed. 2000); HENRY ADAMS, THE
WAR OF 1812 (Harvey Deweerd ed., 1999): JOHN R. ELTING, AMATEURS TO ARMS! A MILITARY
HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1812 (1995); DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTrEN
CONFLICT (1990): PIERRE BERTON, THE INVASION OF CANADA, 1812-13 (1984); J.C.A. STAGG,
MR. MADISON'S WAR:
PIERRE BERTON,

POLITICS, DIPLOMACY, AND WARFARE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

FLAMES ACROSS THE

BORDER

(1982);

LAWRENCE

D.

(1983);

CRESS, CITIZENS

ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE WAR OF

IN

1812 (1982); Frank

A. Cassell, The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812, 70 MD. HIST. MAG. 241 (1975).
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can seamen, 35 as well as perceptions that the British were inciting the
Indians to resist American territorial expansion. Federalists, who
were then a marginalized minority in Congress, strongly opposed both
Madison and the war. 36 Riots broke out between Federalists and
Republicans in major cities across the country. 37 In Baltimore, a Republican mob, several hundred strong, set upon the home of Federal-

ist newspaper publisher Alexander Contee Hanson, beating, shooting,
and stabbing the occupants. 38 Richard Bland Lee's brother, "Light

Horse" Harry Lee, was so badly injured defending Hanson's home
39
that he never really recovered; he ultimately died of his wounds.
Republicans hoped that the war would consolidate their party's
dominance over the Federalists, as well as vindicate American inde-

pendence from England. However, their party was highly factionalized into groups that were united only by their dislike of Madison and

his Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin.40 The country was entirely unprepared for the fiscal burden of the war. Soldiers' and officers' pay

was in arrears for months at a time, bounties were low, and rations
were short because the Republicans had eliminated the quartermaster
41
and commissary departments in 1802 as an austerity measure. Mili-

tia and volunteers were worthless; in the words of one regular army
35. American merchants employed thousands of British subjects as seamen because Americans paid more than British companies. During England's war with Napoleon, British troops
would often board American ships at sea and conscript their citizens. Sometimes, Americans
were impressed (either by accident or design). Negotiations both before and after the War failed
to persuade England to stop this practice. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 11-13.
36. Cassell, supra note 34, at 241. The Federalist policy prior to 1800 had been one of deterrence based on financial preparedness for a war. Due to Hamilton's policies, in 1800 America
was at peace with France and "cordial" with England. Although the country was at peace and
prosperous, the Jeffersonian Republicans attacked high Hamiltonian taxes and characterized the
Federalists as elitists and pro-British, and swept the elections in the "Revolution of 1800."
CRESS, supra note 34, at 150.

37. Cassell, supra note 34, at 241.
38. Id. at 251-57.
39. Id. at 250-60.
40. See STAGG, supra note 34, at 507. The factions were the Old Republicans, led by Randolph of Virginia, who favored small government and thought that Republicans were adopting
too many Federalist policies: the Clintonians, led by George and DeWitt Clinton of New York,
who were trying to pull the Republican Party toward a more centralized federal government
favored by the Federalists; the Invisibles, also known as the Smiths, a small group of Senators
with a reputation for political opportunism and an intense dislike for Gallatin, and Henry Clay's
War Hawks. These last were the dozen or so "young Turks" of the Republican Party, and included Clay and Johnson of Kentucky, as well as John Calhoun. Although they were Republicans, they were able to work together with Federalists. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 27-35.
41. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 78. Republicans were also opposed to the development of a
professional regular army and argued that the standing army would lead to "the destruction of
liberty civil and political." CRESS, supra note 34, at 151. The Republicans instead relied upon
the use of the "citizen militia" for the nation's defense. Id. See also STAGG, supra note 34, at
505.
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officer at the time, they were "little better than organized bandits who
wasted public property, insulted private citizens, and freely engaged in
desertion[,] robbery, [and] disorderly and mutinous conduct." 4 2 Nevertheless, most of the fighting was left to the militia because it was
43
difficult to raise regular troops due to the arrears of pay.
For his part, Madison concluded that invading and conquering Canada would counterbalance devastating losses at sea and on the Chesapeake and silence opposition from both Federalists and his own
party.44 Madison was confident that the United States could easily
win against French Canadians of "uncertain loyalty. 4 5 But Federalists were violently opposed to the invasion of Canada, which they derided as a Republican expansionist dream of empire. Moreover, some
Republicans admitted the intention to annex Canada and make it a
state, which only enlivened opposition to the war. Undisciplined state
militiamen all along the frontier disobeyed orders and refused to cross
the border to fight on Canadian soil. Consequently, the Canadian
campaigns, particularly those along the Niagara frontier in upstate
46
New York in the winter of 1813, were disastrous failures.
By December 1813, the Americans had made significant gains on
the Canadian side of the Niagara River, having captured the British
Fort George and the nearby town of Newark. However, they were
unable to hold their gains because of mutiny and chaos in the ranks, as
"everyone knew that pay was in arrears and that [despite the onset of
winter] the only housing available was tents. '47 On December 10, the
American militia unit assigned to the area reached the end of its enlistment period and disbanded in a mutinous rage over the arrears of
pay. Short of manpower and fearing for his life, the American militia
commander, General McClure, withdrew from Fort George and
burned the entire town of Newark as he left, giving the civilian population only twelve hours notice in below-zero weather to vacate their
homes.4 8 A week later, the British retaliated, attacking Fort Niagara
42. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 77.
43. Id. at 76-78; see also CRESS, supra note 34, at 173 (noting that the inability of the government to raise regular troops effectively left the country's fate in the hands of "inexperienced
regular officers, an assortment of untrained enlistees, and reluctant and undisciplined militia
draftees").
44. STAGG, supra note 34, at 502-03.
45. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 72-74.
46. Id. at 139.
47. Id.
48. McClure claimed that he had been acting under orders from superiors to burn Newark,
however, it later turned out that there was no such order and McClure had been acting on his
own. BERTON, supra note 34, at 251-56. According to Berton, the male residents of Newark
were all either serving with the militia or imprisoned in Fort Niagara so that only women, chil-
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and burning every town along the frontier, including Lewiston and
Buffalo. The militia deserted, and the entire area was set on fire and
reduced to a "blackened smear"; 49 the civilian population was left
destitute and without shelter in the Buffalo winter.5 0 According to
Henry Adams, the Americans were wholly responsible for this "disgrace" in which the British "thinking themselves released from ordinary rules of war by the burning of Newark and Queenston, showed
'5 1
unusual ferocity.
In Lewiston, the British invaded with a thousand troops and five
hundred Indians, who they were completely unable to control. Early
in the morning of December 18, 1813, the Indians reportedly rampaged through the town, terrorizing the sleeping civilian population,
murdering and scalping children before their horrified parents' eyes,
and looting their homes and farms. Children were sent fleeing into
the snow by their parents who stayed to defend their property; many
walked ten miles or more in columns of refugees and were not reunited with their parents until months or even years later. 52 The scene
in Buffalo on December 30, 1813, was from hell:
Like a clap of thunder the alarm gun booms, and panic grips the
village. The first of the retreating militia come dashing through
town, followed by a column of refugees. The terrible word Indians!
Passes, in a scream, from house to house. The flight from Buffalo
begins at once . . . . The town is in a state of anarchy. People are
fleeing in every direction ....An ox team lurches by, pulling a sled
crammed with wounded soldiers, another, loaded with household
goods, carries a settler's family and three exhausted women who
have begged a ride; a ragged party of militia straggles through town,
still carrying the muskets they have never fired. Friendly Seneca
Indians clip-clop past on ponies, their women up behind, babes in
arms. Children are lost and found again. One woman, holding her
baby, tumbles off her horse into a bed of quicksand and is hauled
dren, and elderly residents remained when the town was burned. Many of them assumed that
the American threat to burn the town was empty and did not vacate their homes until it was too
late, and then "roughly turned out into the blowing snow, they see their homes and all their
belongings consumed by fire." Id. at 255. Four hundred people were left homeless and every
building-houses, barns, stables, churches, the courthouse-except for one house were torched
to ash. Id. at 256.
49. Id. at 268.
50. See Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in Fred Manning Collection,
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 217, Box 17, Folder 3: Claims,
War of 1812; BERTON, supra note 34, at 256-57, 267-68; HICKEY, supra note 34, at 139-45.
51. HENRY ADAMS, THE WAR OF 1812 104-05 (Cooper Square Press 1999) (1944). Adams's

account was originally published as part of his monumental nine volume work entitled A HisTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS

(1889-1891).
52. BERTON, supra note 34, at 260-61.
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out at the last moment . . . . Families are separated. Job Hosington's wife, unable to wait any longer for her husband (already
dead) sets out on foot with her six children, turns two of them over
to a passing rider, and does not locate them for weeks; they are
found in separate counties, miles apart ....
Meanwhile the Bemis family and the six younger St. John children have reached Pratt's ferry to find a long queue waiting to cross
the river. Men, women, children, soldiers, oxen, horses, wagons of
every description . . . mill about at the water's edge. Suddenly
Martha St. John hears a loud groan from the multitude and, turning,
sees tall pillars of brown smoke billowing above the treetops. As
the refugees realize that their homes are being destroyed, a sound
of wailing and sobbing, mingled with women's shrieks, ripples
across the crowd. The Bemises are among the last to get across the
river; after nineteen trips, James Johnson, the ferryman gives up and
follows the others in their flight. The family's destination is a tavern
at the little community of Willink. Three miles before they can
reach it, the wagon breaks down. The three St. John sisters . . .
decide to trudge on through the deep snow, leaving the Bemis
couple and the four younger children to spend the night in the cart.
As they pick their way along the strange road, their nerves are
shaken by a weird spectacle: wads of burning matter from
Buffalo,
53
borne on the wind, hurtle over their heads like meteors.
Survivors of that night later wrote that for fifteen miles along the frontier, "nothing was spared which fire could consume or the tomahawk
destroy: and happy was the lot of those citizens who, literally pennyless and naked, had the good fortune to escape with their lives to
' '54
throw themselves upon the charity of strangers.
The following summer, the British Navy attacked the Chesapeake
Bay and followed the river to Washington, looting and burning everything in their path. Even where the residents capitulated, the British
wreaked devastation, and the militia turned tail and ran before the
British army.5 5 When the enemy arrived in the capital in August 1814,
the city was so thoroughly abandoned that no one was there to negotiate the terms of surrender, and it was merely set ablaze. 56 The next
month, Baltimore suffered the same fate. Like the Niagara frontier,
the entire Chesapeake area including the nation's capital was burned
to ash. Maryland Congressman Robert Wright said of the British
' 57
troops that "their conduct ... would have disgraced cannibals.
53. Id at 262-67.
54. See Petition of Pliny A. Field, and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in Fred Manning Collection,
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 217, Box 17, Folder 3: Claims,
War of 1812.
55. CRESS, supra note 34, at 173.
56. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 195.

57. Id. at 204.
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On top of the terrible losses of life and property among civilians
such as those in Niagara and the Chesapeake, the government defaulted on the national debt, provoking a deep fiscal crisis. The highest internal taxes in national history were imposed to defray the cost
of the war, an astronomical $158 million.58 The Federalists bitterly
denounced "Mr. Madison's War" as a "costly, futile, and partisan venture that was likely to produce little good and much evil."' 59 As a result of strong and united Federalist opposition to the war,60 Madison
was under some pressure in 1814 to appoint a Federalist to his cabinet,
but relations between the parties were so thoroughly poisoned that he
refused. 6 1 Ultimately, New England Federalists convened a secret
convention in Hartford to discuss secession, which was rendered moot
by the Treaty of Ghent on February 17, 1815. At best, the terms of the
peace constituted a draw, and none of the issues ostensibly motivating
the war, free trade, and sailors' rights, were resolved favorably for the
62
United States.
By 1815 there was a deep wellspring of anger in the nation at having
made steep sacrifices for no real return. 63 Even before the war was
over, claims began to pour in to Congress, demanding compensation
for civilian property losses due to the failure of the government to
prosecute the war in a reasonable way; for example, failing to pay its
soldiers or to protect its frontiers. 64 The flood of claims escalated after the war's conclusion. 6 5 The claims were referred to the House
Committee of Claims, which most often recommended denial based
on the fact that there were too many similar claims and that all could
not be granted. 66 Still, the number of claims mounted, and the press
was highly sympathetic to the position of the ordinary civilian who
had lost property or life in the war and had received nothing for it, not
even the public benefit of a victory or conclusion on favorable terms,
58. Id. at 303.
59. Id. at 256.
60. The Federalists in Congress voted as a bloc on almost all war legislation, and had a cohesion of over 90% of their members in both houses against everything Madison did. They unanimously opposed the war and voted against every proposal to raise troops or to finance the war.
Id. at 255.
61. Id. at 238.
62. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 301-03; STAGG, supra note 34, at 501-02: ELTING, supra note 34,
at 327.
63. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 301-03.
64. See, e.g., 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 441-42, 446 (1814).

65. See, e.g., id. at 461-62.
66. Id. at 447 (concluding that the government is not bound to compensate civilian losses and
should not make such compensation because there were too many such cases); id. at 461 (concluding that while the numerous civilian losses at the hands of the U.S. forces were regrettable,
there was no "obligation, moral or legal, on the Government to pay for the injury").
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as the angry tone of the Buffalo Gazette editorial demonstrates. 67
This sympathy was stoked by the state of the national treasury, which
was overflowing in the post-war period. As the residents of the Niagara frontier, outraged by the suspension of their claims for wartime
losses, complained to Congress in 1817, "shall it be said that the
American Government, with a surplus revenue of nine millions of dollars in one year, is unable or unwilling to spare ten or twelve hundred
thousand.., to compensate those who have fought, bled and suffered
to produce this extraordinary exuberance of the public treasury...
?"68

As a result, there was little debate in Congress over the Act when it
was proposed in December 1815. What discussion there was focused
on proposals to increase the compensation for lost horses, 6 9 and there
was no debate at all on section 9.70 The bill passed overwhelmingly, as
a majority of Federalists abandoned their remarkably cohesive opposition to everything Madison did in connection with the war and
joined the Republicans 7' in supporting a law that, in the words of the
Chairman of the Committee of Claims, "originat[ed] in the benign and
72
charitable dispositions of Government.

67. See Salisbury, supra note 1, at 3. Congress was obviously aware of public sentiment, as the
language of one Senate report demonstrates. In rejecting a claim for "most severe" losses inflicted by the enemy based on precedent, the committee acknowledged that it would "become
the magnanimity of a Government whose only object should be the protection and prosperity of
all its citizens to dispense relief in cases like these ...." 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS

462 (1816).
68. Petition of Pliny A. Field, and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in Fred Manning Collection,
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 217, Box 17, Folder 3: Claims,
War of 1812. Madison had reported to Congress on December 3, 1816 with "great gratification"
that since the end of the war "the revenue has greatly exceeded all the current demands upon
the treasury, and that, under any probably diminution of its future annual products, which the
vicissitudes of commerce may occasion, it will afford an ample fund for the effectual and early
extinguishment of the public debt." He noted that the country ended 1816 with a surplus of $9
million. James Madison, Message: Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, BuFF.GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1814, at 1. The massive fact of the budget surplus was mentioned
House of Representatives:
repeatedly as a rebuff to opponents of the Act of April 9. See, e.g.,
Monday, January 6--In Continuation, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 1817, at 2 (reporting the

speech of House Speaker Henry Clay in which Clay responded to criticism that the law was too
expensive by saying, "If the nation were in a state of poverty, the reasoning might have weight:
but it was otherwise-there was a surplus in the Treasury").
69. The bill was originally called the "Kentucky Horse Bill." Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.
70. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 398-410 (1816).

71. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 255. The vote was 113 to 15, with 30 Federalists voting in favor
compared with 13 voting against. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 409 (1816).
72. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 590-91 (1818).
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The Lee Commission

Lee moved quickly to establish his office for receiving claims.
' 73
House Speaker Henry Clay gave him space in the "Brick Capitol
building being used by Congress while the Capitol was being rebuilt,
and Lee went to work.74 He issued regulations on June 3, 1816, and
they were published around the country for eight weeks as required
by the law. 75 He also solicited names of citizens from around the
country who could serve as local "discreet commissioners" and began
sending out commissions for the collection of testimony. 76 The Claims
Commission moved swiftly to distribute compensation: between July
and December 1816, Lee made 850 decisions and awarded
$229,693.15. 77 The vast majority of these claims were made under section 1 for the lost horses of militia officers; such claims generally
amounted to less than fifty dollars each. 78 The process for obtaining
compensation under the law was initially a smooth one, particularly
for those claimants who followed Lee's advice and employed Washington attorneys to prepare and present their claims.7 9 Lee approved
73. See http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/MeetingPlaces_
Quarters.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). After the Capitol was destroyed, local Washington
merchants who were fearful that the seat of government would be moved to Philadelphia joined
together to construct a temporary Capitol building (the so-called Brick Capitol) for Congress
while Washington was being rebuilt. It stood on the site of the current Supreme Court building.
74. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 494 (1816); Letter from Richard Bland Lee to
George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, November 2,1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1:
Letters Sent.
75. See, e.g. Office of Claims for Property Lost, Captured, or Destroyed While in the Military
Service of the United States, During the Late War, WASH. WHIC, July 1, 1816, at 1.
76. See generally NARA, RG 217, Entry 622, Letters Received by Richard B. Lee, July 1,
1816-Nov. 5, 1817.
77. Proceedings of the CommissionerAppointed Under the Act for the Payment for Property
Taken or Destroyed by the Enemy During the War with Great Britain, in 36 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: CLAIMS 491 (1816). For the period from July 1 through September 30, 1816, Lee made
354 awards and returned (rejected) approximately fifty claims for insufficient proof. RBL to
John Calhoun, Secretary of War, February 20, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
Sent.
78. See generally Abstracts of Claims, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, vols. 1-5.
79. RBL to Nathanial Carver, July, 1816 (no specific date given), NARA, Record Group 217,
Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent. Lee wrote to Carver, an attorney in the town of Byington, New
York, in response to Carver's letter of July 2, 1816 inquiring about the status of his clients'
claims. Lee responded that the claims were "presented in a form so different from that required" under his regulations that it was impossible to rule on them as they were currently
exhibited. Apparently Carver had bundled a number of claims for his clients together rather
than presenting each separately based on separate affidavits. Lee ended his letter with the
pointed suggestion that the claimants hire "a skillful attorney in this City to manage their concerns at this office who will always be on the spot to communicate with it without the intervention of letters." Most of the claimants under the Act of April 9 took this advice, and a review of
the ledgers indicates that the same handful of lawyers represented many hundreds of claimants.
Lee's suggestion that claimants would do well to appoint local counsel was noted, somewhat
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most claims upon presentation, and the Treasury Department paid the
amount that Lee awarded the same day, usually to the claimant's attorney. 80 While Lee reduced 8' and even rejected8 2 some claims, most
claimants quickly received nearly all of the compensation they requested, at least at the outset.
However, section 9 quickly posed a problem for Lee. As noted
above, most of the war was fought by ill-equipped and ill-trained militia in a constant state of drunken mutiny. There was little discipline in
the ranks and few officers were present giving orders.8 3 Yet the law
provided compensation only for property destroyed while occupied
pursuant to an officer's order. Moreover, the British had burned entire cities and towns in New York and Maryland out of retaliation and
malice, irrespective of any military occupation-for military stores or
otherwise, under orders or not. Claimants and their lawyers struggled
to produce evidence that would be sufficient to sustain a claim under
section 9.84 The evidentiary problem was compounded by the size of
these claims. Compared with the small claims for dead horses and lost
guns, claims under section 9 were astronomically expensive, often exdisapprovingly, in Congress by Kentucky Republican Benjamin Hardin (a supporter of compensation) who pointed out that those claimants who did not have "a couple of lawyers, able lawyers
as the commissioner had notified the people, to carry through their twenty five dollar claims"
would be unable to collect if the law was suspended. House of Representatives, Friday December
13, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.

80. See, e.g., No. 234, Claim of Peter Sailly, Sept. 17, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 61 (claim for $1,199 presented, approved, and paid to attorney John
Law on Sept. 17, 1816); No. 399, Claim of Benjamin Caryl, Lucius Storrs, and Juba Storrs, Oct. 4,
1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 399 (claim for $17,310 presented
on Oct. 4, 1816 and paid in amount of $16,368 to attorney Lew Wallach on Oct. 5, 1816).
81. See, e.g., No. 236, Claim of James Smith, Sept. 17, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 62 (claim for $9000 presented, reduced to $4,270, and paid on Sept. 17,
1816); No. 95, Claim of Richard Epelstyn and John Epelstyn, Sept. 30, 1816, NARA, RG 217,
Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 95 (claim of $2081.75 presented, reduced to $1,409.50,
and paid to attorney John Law on Sept. 30, 1816).
82. See, e.g., No. 103, Claim of Nimrod Woodward, Oct. 7, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625,
Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 103 (claim for $1,299 for damage to land and crops and for destruction of his outhouses due to occupation by the New Jersey militia returned by local commissioners and suspended by Lee for further proof).
83. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 76-78.

84. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, April 30, 1817, NARA, RG
217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent. Lee wrote to Graham objecting to a September, 1816 War
Department directive that no payment could be made under section 9 unless Lee obtained testimony from the officer who had personally ordered the occupation of the claimant's property
(unless that testimony could not for some reason be obtained). Moreover, Graham had decreed
that no claims under section 9 would be paid for the conduct of the "irregular" militia. In Lee's
view, these strictures were "too rigorous on the claimant from the known arbitrary proceedings
of the officers of the irregular army especially and from the extreme difficulty of obtaining from
the officers guilty of such acts evidence against themselves."
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ceeding $10,000 each. 85 Yet Lee found widespread distress and suffering, particularly along the Niagara frontier, that he felt he had a
86
mandate to quickly relieve.

Lee had tried to ease the way somewhat with his regulations. For
example, although claimants were technically required to provide a
certificate from the agent or officer who had ordered the house to be
occupied, the regulations permitted claimants instead to "make an

oath that it is not in his power to procure such certificate, and that the
evidence which he shall offer in lieu thereof is therefore the best
which he is able to obtain.

' 87

This rule enabled the Niagara claimants

to proceed with their claims even though the officer in charge of the
area, General McClure, had been forced to flee for his life from enraged mobs of New Yorkers, while the militia officers, such as there
were, had deserted or been killed in the chaos. However, it became

the subject of one of the first of many struggles between Lee and the
ambitious War Department Assistant Accountant Peter Hagner for
control of the compensation process. 88 Hagner informed Lee on July
17 that Lee was to consult the War Department for the certificates
prior to accepting the claimants' oaths that they could not be obtained. Lee rebuffed this effort to tighten requirements on claimants,
writing to Hagner on July 18 that in his view "the most facile and
ready mode of obtaining such information was to compel the claimant
himself to present the papers. '89
85. See, e.g., No. 36, Claim of Tench Ringgold & Co., Aug. 3, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry
625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 9 (claiming $18,749.89); No. 33, Claim of John Manning, July
30, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 9 (claiming $10,000); No. 7,
Claim of Proprietors of the Washington Hotel, July 9, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract
of Claims, vol. 1, at 2 (claiming $27,093.50); No. 3, Claim of Charles Rop and Samuel Breck,
executors for John Rop, July 1, 1816, NARA RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 1
(claiming $9,900); No. 236, Claim of James Smith, Sept. 17, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623,
Abstract of Claims, vol. 1, at 62 (claiming $9000). While it is true that there were a few smaller
claims pursuant to section 9, see, e.g., No. 327, Claim of John Chalmers, Sept. 23, 1816, NARA,
RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract of Claims, vol 1, at 327 (claiming $600), the vast majority of the
claims were large. Of the twenty-three claims adjudicated under section 9 between July 1, 1816
and October 21, 1816 (when President Madison attempted to impose a narrow interpretation of
section 9 on Lee) only two were for less than $1,000, while fourteen were for more than $5,000.
86. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 490 (1816).
87. Id. at 493.
88. Hagner was named Third (or additional) Auditor of the Treasury Department by President Monroe when that office was created in 1817. He remained in that position until his resignation in 1849, rising to become one of the longest-serving and most important financial officers
in the history of the federal government. See 3 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 25-26 (1888).
89. Letter, RBL to Peter Hagner, Esq., July 18, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1:
Letters Sent. A similar rule for claims under section 5 also generated a scuffle between Lee and
Hagner, that Lee eventually lost when Secretary of War Crawford directed Lee on September
27, 1816 that in all cases of property alleged to have been taken for subsistence of troops, no
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In any event, Lee's regulations did not address the more fundamental (and perhaps to claimants more threatening) question of what con-

stituted "occupation as a military deposite." The then-common usage
of that term referred to a supply depot for military munitions and materiel. 90 But the best the Niagara claimants (as well as those in Maryland and Washington) could ever hope to prove was that the fleeing
and wounded militia and regular troops had tried to hide from the
British Army in the homes of the hapless residents. Lee saw the law

as "remedial & therefore ought to be construed liberally so as to promote and not defeat the remedy intended-that is to say payment for
the injuries sustained by our citizens." 91 Still, the size of the claims
gave Lee pause. 92 Perhaps because of his brother's reputation for fi-

nancial impropriety, Lee wanted someone in authority to bless his expansive interpretation before approving the expensive claims for
property destruction.
In a quandary, Lee first wrote to Attorney General Richard Rush
seeking his advice on July 1, 1816, the first day he officially accepted
claims under the law, asking for an "official" opinion as to "what shall
be deemed 'a military deposite'. ' '93 Specifically, he asked whether the

term was limited to the narrowly defined storing of munitions, or
whether it could extend to include a "military occupation however
transient as quarters for soldiers for a period of a month, a week, or
even less than a day."' 94 He wondered whether, if soldiers used a
house as a fortress from which to attack the enemy, without the order
of an officer, it could be considered an occupation within the law, or
adjudication could be made without the testimony of the officer himself unless Lee himself had
made an effort to obtain it and could not. Lee regarded this rule as too rigorous, and was
sometimes in conflict with Hagner and Graham over his adjudications. Nevertheless, he acceded
in some cases. Lee approved the claim of Benjamin Moore for crops trampled by the militia,
based on an affidavit of the Quartermaster General. Doubtless chastened by the September
directive, Lee did not approve the claim immediately but instead wrote a note to Hagner on the
outside wrapper of the claim asking him whether the "certificate of the acting Q.M. on the
inclosed is regarded as competent evidence" or whether a certificate from the officer on the spot
was required. Hagner replied that in this case the Quartermaster's certificate was acceptable,
and Lee approved the claim the following day. No. 742, Claim of Benjamin Moore, NARA, RG
217, Box 003: Claims #551-799.
90. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2d ed. 1989), at http://dictionary.oed.com

(last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
91. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Mar. 31, 1817, NARA, RG 217,
Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent.
92. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 491 (1816). Lee wrote in his Report to Congress

that he was eager to get Rush's view because "the ninth section of the law provid[ed] for losses
of greater magnitude, and necessarily involv[ed] the payment of large sums of money."
93. Letter, RBL to Richard Rush, July 1, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
Sent.
94. Id.
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whether, if during a battle soldiers occupied a house by orders of an
officer "however inferior his grade," would that be within the law? 95
Surprisingly, Rush brushed him off, saying that he lacked the authority to issue advisory opinions on the meaning of statutes. 96
Frustrated, Lee approached Secretary of War William Crawford
with the same questions. 97 Crawford replied on September 7 that
President Madison had considered the question and had agreed with
Lee that
the occupation of houses and buildings by the military force of the
United States is embraced by the ninth section of the act ...

and

that compensation shall be allowed for damage sustained in consequence of such occupancy, in the same manner as if such houses had
been occupied as a military deposite, under the authority of an officer or agent of the United States. 98

Lee felt that Madison was "sanctioning his own interpretation" 99 of
the law. After receiving this letter, he felt authorized to give the law
the liberal construction he favored. 1°° On September 11, 1816, Lee
began approving the backlog of section 9 claims that had accumulated
while he had waited for Crawford's response.10'
During the month of September 1816, in addition to the seven
claims that were awaiting action pending the reply from Crawford,
Lee adjudicated eight more claims under section 9. Although one
95. Id.
96. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 495 (1816).
97. Letter, RBL to William Crawford, July 5, 1816, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent,
NARA; 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 491 (1816).
98. Id. at 491. In his letter, Lee had explicitly asked Crawford for his interpretation of the
law, not for the President's. Crawford, apparently recognizing the political sensitivity of the
question, referred the inquiry to Madison.
99. Id.
100. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 490, 491 (1816). Lee explained in his Report to
Congress that "it was not till after he received this note, that he felt himself authorized to give to
it a practical construction by a formal adjudication."
101. Lee had received six claims under section 9 between July 1 and September 7, 1816, totaling $61,373.29. All were recorded in the Abstract of Claims but no resolution was indicated.
The ledger books of the Third Auditor show that these claims were adjudicated and paid by the
Treasury after Lee received approval for his broad interpretation of "occupation." After that
time, claims were entered in the Abstract of Claims showing the amount awarded, when it was
received, and by whom. See No. 3, Claim of Charles Rob, Samuel Breck, executors for John
Rob, July 1, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 1; No. 31, Claim of Athanasius Fenwick, July 30, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 8: No. 32,
Claim of Elizabeth Whitaker, July 30, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at
8; No. 98, Claim of Edward McDongall, Aug. 19, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of
Claims, at 25 No. 121, Claim of Michael Helms, Aug. 26, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625:
Abstract of Claims, at 31; No. 122, Claim of Ebenezer Belden, Aug. 26, 1816, NARA, RG 217,
Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 31.
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claim from the Niagara region had been paid in September,' 0 2 in October the claims from the decimated frontier area began to arrive in
earnest. For the first three weeks of October, all of the adjudicated
section 9 claims originated in Niagara County, save one.10 3 An issue
immediately arose in the adjudications of these cases with respect to
the valuation of property, particularly personal property, such as farm
implements, tools, and household furnishings, that had been reduced
to cinders three years earlier, along with every piece of corroborating
evidence that it had ever existed-bills of sale, ledger books, local
merchants' records, household documents.
Lee's policy regarding the valuation of property was akin to his perspective on statutory interpretation: because the purpose of the Act
was to "afford a just redress to the sufferers intended to be relieved,"'1 0 4 Lee tended to defer to owners' estimates of their own
losses.10 5 Not that Lee always awarded claimants every dollar they
sought; he quite often reduced claims. But the reductions were typically made where the record was incomplete, such as where testimony
was inadequate as to the amount or type of furniture lost, 0 6 or where
the appraisal had failed to offset the loss by the value of the ruins,
such as bricks that could be salvaged. 10 7 When the local commission102. No. 366, Claim of Ebenezer Walden, Sept. 28, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 94 (Buffalo).
103. No. 399, Claim of Benjamin Caryl, Lucius Storrs, and Juba Storrs, Oct. 4, 1816, NARA,
RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 101 (Buffalo); No. 550, Claim of Joshua Gillet, Oct.
14, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 139 (Buffalo) No. 552, Claim of
Nathaniel Merril, Oct. 14, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 140 (Ontario
County, N.Y.); No. 596, Claim of Cyrenius Chapin, Oct. 18. 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625:
Abstract of Claims, atl51 (Buffalo); No. 603, Claim of Charles Townsend and George Coit. Oct.
21, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at152 (Buffalo); No. 604, Claim of
Oliver Forward, Oct. 21, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at153 (Buffalo);
No. 153, Claim of Sackett Dodge, Oct. 21, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims,
at 153 (Niagara County, NY). In addition, one claim from New Jersey for damage to property
caused by the New Jersey militia was adjudicated during October 1816. No. 406, Claim of Nimrod Woodward, Oct. 7, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625: Abstract of Claims, at 103.
104. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 491 (1816).
105. Case of William Hodge, NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection, Box 17, Folder 3:
Claims-War of 1812. In this case, the property owner and the appraiser did not agree on the
valuation of the home. Lee deferred to the claimant's estimate because "the owner of property
must generally be regarded as the most accurate judge of its actual value."
106. Unlabeled Claim, NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection, Box 17, Folder 3:
Claims-War of 1812 ("As to the furniture, it seems to be high-priced, and except for the testimony of the party-claimant, it is very vague as to the quantity in the dwelling house when
destroyed.").
107. Letter, RBL to Reuben H. Walworth, Aug. 23, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623: Letters
Sent. Walworth was a local commissioner who had forwarded the claim of Peter Sailly to Lee for
payment. Lee returned the claim to Walworth for further investigation, writing:
The houses seem to have been valued at what they were worth while standing without
making any deduction on account of the value of materials remaining after their de-
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ers appointed by Lee had created an adequate evidentiary record of
testimony by the claimant, and his relatives, friends, and neighbors, as
to the amount and type of property destroyed, Lee's practice was to
accept the testimony and approve the claim. 10 8 After all, the only way
to establish what had been lost was to take the testimony of those who
had seen it prior to its destruction. Lee admitted the hazard that
neighbors and friends could "magnify each others' losses" in order to
boost their awards. 10 9 Nevertheless, in Lee's view, the overarching
objective of the law was to render justice to the citizens who had suffered terrible losses in the war through no fault of their own, 110 even if
"in some instances claimants may have received more than they were
entitled to."1'11
A second problem with the valuation of the Niagara claims came in
mid-August when Lee discovered that the State of New York had appropriated and distributed $50,000 for relief in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe. Lee, who had been unaware of these
payments, had been awarding claimants the full amount of their losses
with no offset for the prior aid by the state. On August 16, he wrote
to Governor Tompkins of New York asking for information about the
relief payments. Noting that "many heavy claims" had been
presented to the federal government from the Niagara region, he
wrote that he felt it was his duty to determine "the actual amount of
the loss" experienced by the claimants in order to avoid "a two-fold
compensation... for the same injury."' 112 Although Lee later decided
that he would offset any payments by the state against his awards, by
that time he had already authorized over $100,000 in payments to Niagara sufferers who had already received half that amount for their
injuries from the State of New York. 113 This embarrassing situation,
together with the generous approach Lee took toward the valuation of
losses, likely fueled the perception in Congress and the administration
struction. If the buildings were of brick or stone as the cellars must have been, some
value must have remained which ought to have been deducted from the estimate of the
houses as they stood... You will be pleased therefore in all future cases to observe this
direction and will be good enough to make me a supplemental report in the case of
Peter Sailly in conformity to the opinion herein expressed.
Id.
108. Letter, RBL
109. Id.
110. Letter, RBL
PERS: CLAIMS 495.
111. Letter, RBL
112. Letter, RBL
623: Letters Sent.
113. Letter, RBL
623: Letters Sent.

to Henry Clay, Feb. 28, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623: Letters Sent.
to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28, 1816, in 36

AMERICAN STATE PA-

to Henry Clay, Feb. 28, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623: Letters Sent.
to D.D. Tompkins, Governor of New York, Aug. 16, 1816, RG 217, Entry
to D.D. Tompkins, Governor of New York, Oct. 19, 1816, RG 217, Entry
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that Lee was doing a poor job of protecting the Treasury against selfinterested claimants.
While Lee wrestled with these issues, the size and number of the
claims from the Niagara frontier attracted the attention of the Treasury Department. Joseph Nourse, the Register of the Treasury, wrote
to Lee asking how much he thought the government would be required to pay in claims under the Act of April 9 during 1816.114 Lee
wrote back that so far he had only disbursed $31,953.11, but that a lot
of larger claims were pending and he expected an influx of expensive
property claims when Congress reconvened in December. Lee estimated that payments might approach half a million dollars by the end
of the year. 115 At that level, the claims could consume more than five
percent of the entire federal budgetary surplus.
Immediately after this revelation, Lee received a series of directives
from Crawford and Madison aimed at reducing those estimates. First,
on September 27, Crawford instructed Lee that no claims under section 5 for property taken for the subsistence of the troops would be
approved without the testimony of the officer by whose order it was
taken. This rule countermanded Lee's regulation that had permitted
claimants to offer other evidence if they were unable to obtain the
testimony of the officer, at least with respect to section 5. Moreover,
Crawford informed Lee that Madison had decided that the entire Act
of April 9 did not cover any "property destroyed by the irregular conduct of the soldiery"-that is, the wantonly destructive behavior of
116
the militias.
A few weeks later, when the "very many heavy claims" from Niagara that Lee had anticipated in his letter to Nourse had materialized,
Lee received a second letter from Crawford. Madison had suddenly
reversed himself on the interpretation of "occupation," and Lee was
114. The Register of the Treasury was a forerunner of the modern-day Financial Management
Service, responsible for account-keeping and management of the public debt. Nourse was a
Virginian who had been appointed by Washington to be the first Register of the Treasury; he had
entered the public service as military secretary to Lee's brother Charles during the Revolutionary War. 4 JAMES GRANT WILSON & JOHN FISKE, APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 541 (1888).

115. Letter, RBL to Joseph Nourse, Register of the Treasury, undated (sent between Aug. 23
and Oct. 19), NARA, RG 217, Entry 623: Letters Sent.
116. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Apr. 30, 1817, NARA, RG
217, Entry 623: Letters Sent. Lee later objected that both of these strictures were "too rigorous
on the claimants" and that
in many instances [would] produce manifest injustice as it is a notorious fact that our
military discipline had never during the whole late war especially in relation to the
major part of the public force been reduced to such rules as to prevent injuries from the
soldiery to the inhabitants of the country beyond the control of their officers.
Id. See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text.
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now informed that in order to qualify for compensation under section
9, a claimant's house had to be occupied at the time of its destruction,
and occupation for a night upon a march was not within the ambit of
the law unless it had been in the immediate presence of the enemy.
Crawford also instructed Lee not to pay for interest, rent, or damages
since the time of the destruction, nor for consequential damages resulting from the destruction of houses or buildings (fire spreading to
barns and other outbuildings for example). Finally, Lee was instructed that in cases of "doubt, or of great importance" he was required to "submit evidence to the Executive before any decision was
17
made."
The effect of this turnabout by Madison was to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of some $137,000 in section 9 claims that Lee had already
approved and paid. Suddenly, Lee found himself in the awkward position of having to defend himself for awarding compensation in cases
where the President, his close friend and benefactor, had now deemed
it to be outside the scope of the law. Even more humiliating was the
suggestion in Madison's letter that Lee's discretion required policing
"in cases of great importance"-high value claims-which meant
practically all the section 9 claims, from Niagara and everywhere else.
Lee doubtless felt personally betrayed, though his need for a job probably kept him from expressing it much. 118 But he also felt something
else that he did not hesitate to express-concern for the claimants,
and for their now-diminished prospects under the new regime.
C. A Bearing to the Side of Poverty and Wretchedness
Lee often said that he saw his job as the speedy distribution of federal relief monies to the innocent sufferers who had lost out in the war
through no fault of their own. He believed that this was Congress's
117. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 491, 495 (1816).

118. While Lee always made the elaborate display of deference and formality that was expected of someone of his class and status, he occasionally could not disguise his resentment. For
example, in a letter to Graham on March 31, 1817, Lee defended his interpretation of section 5
as including both real and personal property against a new more restrictive interpretation by
Monroe's new Attorney General, noting stiffly that his "interpretation was not objected to either
by the late President or the late Congress." He sniffed that President Monroe was of course free
to reverse Lee's decision, as "by the 11th section of the act of the ninth of April 1816, the
Legislature has properly confided to him the interpretation of it." He concluded that his letter
was not intended to challenge the Attorney General "who is certainly more competent to interpret a law than I will presume to be." Letter, RBL to George Graham, Mar. 31, 1817, NARA,
RG 217, Entry 623: Letters Sent. Again in April he challenged Graham on Monroe's interpretation of section 5 and noted repeatedly that previously "the sole power of deciding was vested
in the Commissioner as the head of this office." Letter, RBL to George Graham, Apr. 30, 1817,
NARA, RG 217, Entry 623: Letters Sent.
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clear intention in passing the Act of April 9, and he had taken great
care to set up his Commission, draft his regulations, take evidence,
and make decisions in a manner that fostered that larger, and to his
mind, noble legislative purpose. In his words, he intended to "fulfil
the views of the Legislature, by affording a just redress to the sufferers
intended to be relieved."1 19 Madison's directive was therefore not
merely a threat to his position or reputation (though it was that); it
was a threat to consign the victims, with whom Lee had come to sympathize deeply, to "undeserved misery and want.11 20 Lee decided to
become their advocate against forces in the government who had
lined up against them.
The most important of these was George Graham, who was then
the chief clerk of the War Department, along with his Assistant Accountant Peter Hagner. Graham, a lawyer who had graduated from
Columbia College (now Columbia University), was an influential figure in the Department with a reputation as a "troubleshooter. ' 12 1
Madison's new position on section 9 reflected Graham's skepticism
about the validity of the Niagara claims, as well as about Lee's sympathetic stance toward the claimants. In October 1816, Graham and Lee
had a conversation in which Graham informed Lee that he did not
believe that any of the Buffalo claims were valid. According to Graham, the British had made an official declaration that they had burned
every house in retaliation for the American conduct at Newark, rather
than destroying particular houses because they were occupied or used
as deposits. 122 In Graham's view, these facts made it clear that the
Buffalo claimants were simply out of luck. 123 Lee disagreed, and continued to approve the claims, feeling that he had the President's approval for his expansive interpretation. Then, on October 16
Crawford became the head of Treasury and Madison named Graham
Acting Secretary of War. Five days later, Lee was notified that the
119. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 491 (1816).
120. Letter, RBL to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623:
Letters Sent.
121. Obituary, George Graham, Captain, United States Army & Public Servant, http://www.
arlingtoncemetery.net/g-graham.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). Graham had been a cavalry
commander during the War and had been appointed chief clerk by Monroe while the latter was
Secretary of War in 1813. His reputation as a problem-solver in that position led to his appointment by Madison to the delegation (led by Clay) that negotiated the peace with England. Id.
122. Sir George Prevost issued a proclamation two weeks after the carnage at Buffalo defending the British conduct as justified by the American provocation. Prevost said that he would not
"pursue further a system of warfare so revolting to his own feelings and so little congenial to the
British character unless the future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to
it." ADAMS, supra note 51, at 105.
123. Letter, RBL to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28. 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623:
Letters Sent.
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President had acceded to the narrow construction favored by Graham
and that Lee was now required to submit any cases of "doubt or great
1 24
importance" to the executive-meaning to Graham-for decision.
At that point, Lee's only recourse was to appeal directly to the President and on October 28 he did just that. In a letter to Crawford, Lee
recounted his disagreement with Graham regarding the Buffalo
claims, and sent along the testimony in the case of Buffalo claimant
Gilman Fulsom for the President's consideration, as a case in which
doubt-Graham's-was entertained. 125 Lee then seized the opportu-

nity to lay out for Madison his case for allowing the Niagara claims
under section 9. First, he noted that he had never received any official
declaration from the British government or military officers regarding
their motives for burning the frontier. Even if such an official declaration had been made, however, Lee urged that it should be discounted

as against "the testimony of our own citizens," and noted that he certainly had no power to take testimony from outside the United

States-the statute required only that he obtain the best evidence
which the nature of the case would admit, which was, in his view, the
testimony of residents "where the destruction was made.' 2 6
Second, and more importantly to Lee, was the statute's charge that
he consider both the claims of individual justice, as well as the interest
of the United States. Lee saw no tension between these two objectives because, in his view, the latter was "more certainly promoted and

permanently established by acts of justice and retribution to its citizens who have innocently suffered in a war waged for the common
benefit than consigning them to undeserved misery and want ...

"

Lee wrote that he was
124. It is possible that the conflict between Lee and Graham was not merely ideological,
though it clearly was that. Lee, upon his retirement from Congress in 1795, had returned to
Loudoun County, Virginia where he was once again elected to the House of Delegates. Redistricting then put his estate, Sully, into Fairfax County, and he was elected again from that county
in 1799, but he retired the following year rather than be defeated by the Republican candidate in
the Jeffersonian Republican "Revolution of 1800." Templeman & Montague, supra note 17, at
32. George Graham, Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican, was elected to the House of Delegates from Fairfax County after Lee's retirement. 2 JAMES GRANT WILSON & JOHN FISKE, Ap-

703 (1887).
125. Claim of Gilman Fulsom, Aug. 10, 1816-Dec. 5, 1854, RG 217, Entry 627, Box 17: Miscellaneous Files E-M, Settled Claim Files and Related Records. Lee's letter was addressed to the
Secretary of War and he refers to Graham as the chief clerk of the War Department although
Graham was by that date the Acting Secretary of War. In any event, it is clear that Lee's intended recipient was neither Crawford nor Graham but Madison, whom he asks to resolve the
dispute. Letter, RBL to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623:
Letters Sent.
126. Letter, RBL to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623,
vol. 1: Letters Sent.
PLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
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[viery sensible that, in the adjudications which I am bound to make,
it will be very difficult always to hit precisely the middle course of
rendering a reasonable justice to the claimant without in any degree
trenching upon the interest of the nation. But here humanity, considering the relative situation of the parties, will excuse (if any
should be discovered)
a bearing to the side of poverty and
127
wretchedness.
Leaving the New Yorkers to their own devices seemed to him indefensible for any government based on "justice and equality of
rights." To drive that point home, Lee noted that the British Government had indemnified all the losses of its Canadian subjects, including
those at Newark, regardless of whether inflicted by their own troops
or the Americans. Nevertheless, if Madison rejected Fulsom's claim
then Lee would "consider it [his] duty to obey." He made it clear,
however, that if the President agreed with George Graham's interpretation of section 9, doubt would inevitably be cast on the propriety of
all of Lee's prior adjudications from the frontier. 128 Finally, Lee informed the President that he was suspending all adjudications under
section 9 pending Madison's decision whether or not the Niagara
claims would be allowed.
On November 1, Graham, who had by then officially taken over
from Crawford, wrote to Lee inquiring about the status of his adjudications under section 9 and Lee reiterated that all action on section 9
claims had been halted until he received guidance from Madison as to
its interpretation.1 2 9 However, Madison decided to duck the question
and throw the issue of the Niagara claims to Congress. On December
6, Madison informed Congress that he had suspended proceedings
under section 9 until "Congress should have an opportunity of defining, more precisely, the cases contemplated by them.' 130 On December 16, Graham ordered Lee not to make any final decisions under the
Act of April 9 but to "proceed to prepare and arrange all cases for
13 1
decision when it shall be deemed proper."
127. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 495 (1816).

128. Letter, RBL to The Hon. Secretary of War, Oct. 28, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623,
vol. 1: Letters Sent. Lee tried to leave himself an escape from this unpleasant prospect by
suggesting that Fulsom's claim did not "rest[ ] upon such strong evidence as the few in which I
have made awards," so that Madison could, if he chose, turn down Fulsom on the basis of the
ostensibly weak evidence in his case rather than because the official declaration of the British
had excluded the Niagara frontier claims from the law entirely. Id.
129. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Nov. 1, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
Sent.
130. XVth Congress. House of Representatives, Thursday, Dec: 5, Bup. GAZETrE, Dec. 24,
1816, at 2.
131. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 496 (1816).
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The suspension provoked tremendous anxiety on the Niagara frontier,132 and the residents wrote to Lee asking what would become of
their claims. Lee attempted to calm their fears. For example, in a
November 25 letter to A.W. Stoddard, a local official commissioned to
take testimony in the area, Lee instructed him to continue hearing
claims. He reported that Madison had decided to refer the question
of the scope of the law to Congress, which would convene on December 3. Although Madison was concerned not to give the law a broader
reading than that intended by Congress, Lee was confident that the
legislature would support his interpretation of section 9, and he assured Stoddard that he did not "expect that the claimants will be put
33
on worse ground than that on which they now stand."'
Despite Lee's confident response to Stoddard, there were other
troubling signs that things were not going well for him or for the Act
of April 9. For one thing, Lee was about to be evicted from his borrowed space in the Brick Capitol when Congress reconvened on December 2 and Graham refused to give him space "in any public
edifice," forcing Lee to rent office space in a private home. 134 In addition, the local commissioners appointed by Lee had not been paid for
taking the voluminous testimony supporting the claims and they were
demanding "suitable compensation" for their time and labor. In August 1816 Lee had attempted to pacify them by promising to seek a
"proper provision" for them, but none had been made by the end of
the year. 135 Thus, on December 9, Lee wrote to President-Elect
Monroe asking for funds to cover his office rent and to pay the commissioners. 136 The Claims office, which had begun as a bi-partisan
gesture of goodwill following a divisive and unpopular war, was perhaps starting to look-at least to Graham-like a political liability.
132. See Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in NARA., RG 217, Box 17,
Folder 3: Fred Manning Collection, Claims, War of 1812.
133. Letter, RBL to A.W. Stoddard, Esq., Nov. 25, 1816, RG 217, Entry 623, vol.1: Letters
Sent, NARA.
134. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Nov. 2, 1816, NARA, RG 217,
Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent; Letter, RBL to President-Elect James Monroe, Dec. 9, 1816,
NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent.
135. Letter, [illegible] & Jonas Williams to RBL, Sept. 10, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Box 17,
Folder 3: Fred Manning Collection, Claims-War of 1812.
136. Letter, RBL to President-Elect James Monroe, Dec. 9, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623,
vol. 1: Letters Sent. Though Lee did receive a supplemental appropriation in 1817 for contingent expenses (presumably including office rent), it was inadequate to pay the commissioners,
who remained uncompensated. In September 1817 two of the commissioners from Buffalo
wrote to Lee in desperation asking him to "inform us of the probability of obtaining it [payment]
and what measures would be necessary for us to take for that purpose?" Letter, [illegible] &
Jonas Williams to RBL, Sept. 10, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Box 17, Folder 3: Fred Manning Collection, Claims-War of 1812.
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The CongressionalAssault on the Commissioner of Claims

Congress took up the Act of April 9 immediately upon reconvening
in December. However, rather than concentrating on the question
posed by Madison, that is, the interpretation of Section 9, Congress
focused its attention-and approbation-on Lee himself. The House
quickly passed a resolution calling for Lee to report on his decisionmaking process and the status of the claims. 137 The administration
organ National Intelligencer138 reported that on December 13 Republican John Forsyth of Georgia had argued that Lee should be dismissed because "from want of understanding, or from want of
integrity, incorrect decisions had certainly been made by the commissioner."1 39 Although Forsyth's motion to ask the President to suspend
the operation of the law failed, the matter was turned over to the
Committee of Claims,14 0 chaired by Bartlett Yancey. Yancey had
voted along party lines for the Act of April 9 the previous spring but
had had second thoughts and was now in favor of repeal.' 4' Lee had
already been called before the Committee of Claims that morning to
defend his judgments, and his testimony did not go well. Representative Yancey told the House that he would personally vouch for the
fact that Lee's interpretations were unlawful and that he should be
142
stopped.
The crux of the accusation against Lee was that his interpretations
were too broad and were intended to aid the claimants in receiving
compensation at the expense of the Treasury. Forsyth and Yancey
gave several examples of claims that illustrated the problem. One was
the claim of Benjamin Moore, to whom Lee had awarded $175 for the
trampling of his crops. Lee and Peter Hagner had tussled over the
validity of this claim in November and Lee had eventually paid it despite the fact that Hagner thought Moore should have had to observe
long-standing War Department rules for obtaining payment for prop137. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Dec. 12, 1816, NARA, RG
217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent.
138. 16 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE § 21 (1907-1921).
139. Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.

140. Congress at first appointed a select committee to inquire into the decisions of Lee.
House of Representatives, Thursday, Dec. 5, BUFF. GAZETTE, Dec. 24, 1816, at 2. However, that
process quickly bogged down when the committee became overwhelmed by the volume of
records, evidence, and materials produced by Lee's commission and failed to make a report. 30
ANNALS OF CONG. 427 (1817). It then asked to be discharged and have the matter turned over
to the Committee of Claims. See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES 1815-1817 125 (1817).
141. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 409 (1815).
142. Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.
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erty taken for subsistence. 143 Forsyth said that after receiving information from "the heads of departments,"1 44 he had taken it upon
himself to look over Lee's abstract books and was satisfied that this
decision and others like it were wrong. 14 5 In each of these cases, Forsyth and Yancey argued that Lee had broadly (and illegitimately) interpreted the provisions of the Act in order to make an award to
undeserving claimants. 146 The question of the Act of April 9 was urgent, according to Forsyth, because Lee had unreviewable discretion:
Gentlemen appeared not to recollect the peculiar nature of this
act: every judgment the commissioner made, however erroneous,
or however corrupt, was instantly paid at the Treasury of the United
States, and the money beyond the control of this House. If there
had been a controlling power; if there had been any appellate jurisdiction by which the acts of this commssioner were to be revised
and examined, he should never, he said, have thought
of introducing
14 7
this resolution. But it was directly the contrary.
Lee was not without his defenders, however. A few members leapt to
the defense of his reputation, 148 while others defended both the delegation of discretion to Lee and the principle of compensation. 14 9 The
House narrowly voted 68-64 to table the matter and wait for the reports of Lee and of Yancey's Committee.
143. No. 742, Claim of Benjamin Moore, NARA, RG 217, Box 003: Claims #551-799. Lee
had sent Hagner a note asking whether the testimony of the Quartermaster was acceptable, and
Hagner wrote back on the outside flap of the claim that it was but that "[tihe regulations of the
War Department prescribe a different form for ascertaining the damages of land occupied by the
troops of the United States." He then returned it to Lee.
144. Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.
Though it is not clear precisely which department heads Forsyth is referring to, Lee's struggles
that fall with Hagner over the Moore claim, which then appeared in Forsyth's possession, and
with Graham over the Niagara claims, suggests that the congressional inquiry was launched by
information from Graham and Hagner.
145. Other claims mentioned as being wrongly decided were those of William O'Neale for the
sinking of his ship, and Daniel Carroll for the burning of the Washington Hotel in the capital.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Richard Mentor Johnson of Kentucky called Lee a "man of integrity, and beyond the
reach of any imputation of corruption, while a letter to the editor signed AMICUS published the
same day in the Intelligencer decried the fact that the debate had unfairly tarnished Lee's reputation. The letter concluded with "FIAT JUSTITIA RUAT COELUM" ("let justice be done
though heaven may fall"). AMICUS, Letter to the Editor,NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816,
at 2.
149. Johnson of Kentucky and Grosvenor of New York argued that differing interpretations
under Section 9 were to be expected and that the act had delegated the task of interpretation to
the commissioner. Robert Wright of Maryland, where losses were nearly as severe as those in
the Niagara region, agreed with Lee's "latitude of construction." In his view, "[i]f every individual in the United States were paid for losses during the war, it would be a perfectly just principle." Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.
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A few days later, on December 17, before Congress had received
Lee's report, Yancey's Committee, unsurprisingly, issued a report
harshly critical of Lee. After recounting several cases that the Committee claimed demonstrated that Lee's decisions were far too generous to claimants, the Committee report concluded that
considering the extended construction which has been given to the
law, and the erroneous decisions made under it,... the act should
be so amended as to repeal a part of its provisions, and transfer the
settlement of claims under it to the War Department .... [because]
the cases provided for will there be determined, according to uniform principles observed in the settlement of claims under the control and responsibility of the head of that Department, and will pass
through the several offices in the usual way of transacting business,
and subject to the usual checks known to be so salutary in the settlement of accounts. 150
The Committee thus reported a bill amending the law that would have
subjected the claims to review by a more extensive bureaucratic apparatus than that provided by a single commissioner with ultimate discretion. Instead, Graham's War Department, under the supervision of
accountant Peter Hagner, should process the claims according to "uniform principles" and "subject to the usual checks."
E.

Fraud,Forgery, and Perhaps Perjury: The Niagara Claims
in Congress

A flurry of activity followed the release of the Committee of
Claims' report on December 17. On the same day, Lee forwarded his
own report to Madison by way of Graham, however, it was not officially transmitted to the House until December 23.151 Meanwhile, the
Niagara claimants, panic stricken by this turn of events, submitted
their own petition to the House intended to remind Congress of their
suffering and refute Graham's opinion that they were not entitled to
recover. 152 For his part, Lee tried to dispel allegations that he had
(corruptly or innocently) opened the Treasury to claimant perfidy. By
150. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 486, 487 (1816).
151. Richard Bland Lee, Proceedings of the Commissioner Appointed Under the Act for the
Paymentfor Property Taken or Destroyed by the Enemy Duringthe War with Great Britain, in 36
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 490-96 (1816) (prepared Dec. 17, 1816, transmitted by President Madison to the House of Representatives Dec. 23, 1816).
152. See Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in NARA, RG 217, Box 17,
Folder 3: Fred Manning Collection, Claims-War of 1812. The Petition covered 22 very long,
densely-handwritten pages. Unfortunately, no one in Congress read it, because it was never
printed. Thomas Grosvenor complained about the refusal of the House to print the Petition, and
John Randolph, the Virginia Republican (and Lee relation) who had led the blistering attack on
the credibility and veracity of the claimants shot back sotto voce that they should have printed it
themselves. 30 ANNALS OF CONG 389 (1816).
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this time, Lee was aware that he was fighting for his political life (and
his salaried position) and he was determined to defend himself. His
strategy was to cast himself as a faithful and cautious minister carrying
out the will of the Executive and the intent of the Legislature. He
recounted in meticulous detail his efforts to parse the statute so that in
drafting the regulations he would "enter into the views of the Legislature" by "giving such an interpretation to the provisions of the said act
as might secure substantial justice to the sufferers intended to be re'153
lieved, and, at the same time, guard against fraud and imposition.
He also laid out his multiple efforts to "avail himself of every assistance which appeared to be within his reach, to enable him to give
[section 9] a fair, a reasonable, and a just interpretation" including the
full text of his letter to Rush, his letter to Crawford, Madison's approval of the expansive interpretation, and then, the October 21 letter
informing him that the President had changed his mind. He also attached numerous exhibits to his report, marked A through H, that
included his regulations, and a list of private bills decided by Congress
the prior year that he said he had used as a rough guide to congressional intent in interpreting the Act of April 9.154
Compared with Lee's report, the petition of the Niagara claimants
is interesting for what it did not do. The petitioners did not really
bother to contend that the claimants' homes were occupied at all (despite the fact that this is precisely what Lee had been required to conclude in order to approve their claims). Instead, the claimants
contested the legitimacy of that requirement as "too narrow for the
attainment of national Justice, as applicable to the various events of
155
the late war."
After offering a lengthy blow-by-blow account of the devastating
events of December 1813, and carefully describing the incompetence
and brutality of General McClure and the American militias, they
concluded that it was appropriate to make a broad reading of the act
based on the principle underlying the law that the government was
"instrumental in producing the loss."156 Even if all the buildings were
not occupied and the Niagara frontier was burned in retaliation for
McClure's destruction of Newark, the claimants contended that they
were entitled to relief upon the general principles undergirding the
153. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 490 (1816).

154. Id. at 491-96.
155. Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in NARA, RG 217, Box 17,
Folder 3:Fred Manning Collection, Claims-War of 1812.
156. Id. This is consistent with Adams's suggestion that the Buffalo residents blamed the
Americans rather than the British for their losses because they thought that American atrocities
in Canada had "warranted some retaliation." ADAMS, supra note 51, at 105.
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Act of April 9, as well as "upon every principle which defines the
' 57
obligation, of civilized society.'
[W]here, we may ask, are we to look for the foundations of that
patriotism, of that sacred love of Country which attaches and binds
each citizen to his fellow citizen? Is it not to be traced exclusively to
that community of interest, that identity of fortune, and that consequent sympathy of feeling to which
we are destined by the opera158
tion of our political institutions?
The petitioners concluded that the suspension of their claims (but
not the smaller horse and wagon claims) 59 had "set afloat the elements of disunion and avarice" that threatened to plunge the nation
into a "disgraceful squabble for property amongst ourselves." Instead, they argued that the claims should be paid based on "sacred
principles of union and equality. ' 160 Thus, the petitioners had left Lee
perilously exposed. They had all but admitted the essence of the
charge against him-that their homes had not really been occupied at
all but Lee had stretched the terms of the law and had knowingly accepted perjured testimony based on some vague principles of sympathy and the social contract.
The case of Gilman Fulsom, which Lee forwarded to Madison after
Graham had expressed his doubts about the Niagara claims, serves as
an example. Fulsom's claim was for $4,850 for the destruction of two
houses. The proof of occupation accepted by by Lee was the lone
affidavit of Cyrenius Chapin, a surgeon and resident of Buffalo, who
had led a band of partisan guerillas during the war.' 6' Chapin was
only marginally in the militia (though he was technically made a Lieutenant Colonel at some point during the War). He had a history of
insubordination against his commanders. He been present at the
burning of Newark and had vehemently protested the decision to McClure, and the two had nearly come to blows. Chapin and McClure
hated each other-McClure had even publicly stated his wish that the
157. Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in NARA, RG 217, Box 17,
Folder 3: Fred Manning Collection, Claims-War of 1812.
158. Id.
159. While the claimants said that they didn't want to criticize other citizens who had small
claims under the Act of April 9, they "cannot refrain from remarking in support of our own
claims, that we can discover no difference between the cases of a horse or waggon or a house lost
in consequence of their being in the public service, except in the amount of the loss. Could your
memorialists believe that the merit of a claim was to be measured by the smallness of its amount,
and that an individual was to be preferred because he had lost but little; then, indeed, they
consider their case as a deplorable onr, for they have lost their all." Id. (alteration in original).
160. Id.
161. BERTON, supra note 34, at 80-84
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enemy would capture Chapin (he later was captured but escaped). 162
After the British had captured Fort Niagara and marauded through
Lewiston, Chapin led a pack of his followers in chasing McClure down
main street shouting "Shoot him down!" Someone fired, and Chapin
was jailed for mutiny but was quickly released by the citizens themselves. 163 Ten days later, Chapin tried on his own initiative to surrender the town of Buffalo in order to save it, but the British refused to
accept the surrender because Chapin had no official standing to offer
it. He was taken prisoner and separated from his two young daugh164
ters while the town was burned.
Chapin had then given an affidavit that he was the officer who had
ordered two houses owned by Fulsom to be occupied for a hospital
and a barracks and that "considerable damage was done to the houses
while occupied."'1 65 Chapin's public denunciation of McClure as responsible for the burning of Buffalo, and his lack of official standing
as a military official in Buffalo, may have cast some suspicion on the
veracity of his testimony; he might have been seen as willing to lie in
order to aid the residents of his town, whom he felt had suffered needlessly due to the actions of the government.
Moreover, Fulsom's case highlights a second, and perhaps thornier,
problem with the Niagara claims. Chapin himself had filed a claim
and received $17,584 from Lee. 166 Almost without exception, every
witness was a claimant and every claimant a witness in someone else's
case. The moral hazard problem was unavoidable-because every
stick of property had literally gone up in smoke, transformed into the
wads of burning soot that wafted over the heads of the St. John sisters
as they trudged along-there was no way to verify what was lost without relying on the testimony of others from the community "who have
seen the property prior to its destruction."'' 67 These two problems
combined to provoke a bitter and protracted struggle in Congress
over the treatment of the war claims that lasted nearly a decade and
cost Lee his reputation and career.
162. Id. at 252.
163. Id. at 261.
164. Id. at 265-66.
165. Claim of Gilman Fulsom, NARA, RG 217, Entry 627, Box 17, Miscellaneous Files E-M,
Settled Claim and Related Records, Aug. 10, 1816-Dec. 5, 1854.
166. No. 596, Claim of Cyrenius Chapin, Oct. 18, 1816, NARA, RG 217, Entry 625, Abstract
of Claims, vol. 1, at 151. Chapin had claimed $21,127 for a "dwelling house, other buildings,
furnishes, and horses" but only $17,584 was satisfactorily proved.
167. Letter, RBL to Henry Clay, Feb. 28, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
Sent.
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Congressional debate on the claims law and on Lee's conduct as
commissioner lasted for several weeks and was unusually sharp. As
the Intelligencer reported, section 9 was the "principal bone of contention. ' 168 The debate was so long and intense that the newspaper,
which usually carried a full report of each day's congressional proceedings found itself devoting pages to this issue and ignoring everything else. 169 Henry Clay, the influential Republican Speaker of the
House, came out strongly in Lee's defense and in support of the Buffalo claimants. In Clay's view, Lee had not had "fair play on this
floor," given that he had made over seven hundred decisions but was
170
being pilloried for making, at most, a few questionable judgments.
Moreover, Clay agreed with Lee's decision to act liberally with respect
to the Niagara frontier, given that the government had decided to
carry the war into Canada ...[where] every house became a garrison, every man a soldier. Scarcely a man had escaped without the
loss of life or property. If, in the case of a war of this kind, individuals suffer losses, ought they not to be171
indemnified as far as is consistent with the ability of the country?
Clay was not alone in his support for Lee. New York Federalist
Thomas Peabody Grosvenor also approved Lee's sympathetic treatment of the claimants:
[I]f the Commissioner should err in one out of a thousand cases, he
would only award payment to some poor wretch, whose misfortune
it would be that his loss, equally grievous with others, did not come
within the nice technicalities of the law. In committing such an error, if I were the commissioner... I would solace myself with the
recollection of it during my whole life. [He] would grant too much
rather than too little. It was really but a trifle, after all. Suppose
Congress were to give to the Niagara sufferers all they had lost-it
would be but a few hundred thousand dollars. Throughout the
whole United States, if all losses were to be paid for ...he did not
believe that they would amount to two millions; with the provisions
of the persent
law, he did not believe the amount would be a
million. 172
168. Sketch of a Debate in the House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 1, 1817,
at 2.
169. Congress, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 1, 1817, at 3 (informing readers that the paper was
unable to print the other proceedings of the House and Senate because of the extensive coverage
of the compensation debates); Claims' Law, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 1817, at 2 (noting
that the paper had carried such extensive coverage of the claims' law debate that "it is presumed
that no other than a general view of the Debate can be at all interesting to our readers").
170. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 383 (1816).
171. Id. at 384.
172. Id. at 389-90.
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Speaking a few days later, Republican Robert Wright of Maryland
(where there were hundreds of unresolved Chesapeake claims) opposed both the repeal of section 9 of the law and the report of the
Committee of Claims, "the adoption of which would be outrageously
unjust. to the Commissioner, who would be the victim of clamor, which
it was always easy to raise." According to Wright, "no man could
have walked with more caution than Mr. Lee had in performing his
17 3
duty . . . and his efforts to act properly in fulfilling his trust.
Wright pointed out Lee's many efforts to obtain guidance from the
Attorney General and the President and asked whether
any man could proceed more earnestly in search of light to guide
them to a correct construction of the law and its correct administration. He had manifested the greatest deliberation, and after seeking
advice of those who were authorized 174
to give it, he received directions to act precisely as he had acted.
Despite the support of major figures in both parties, including Henry
Clay and most of the War Hawks, 175 Lee faced rough sledding in the
House, where according to newspaper accounts, his reputation was
"severely animadverted upon."1 7 6 Republican Benjamin Hardin of
Kentucky called Lee a "little, petty Commissioner"'177 and argued that
Lee's efforts to consult with the attorney general and the president
proved not that he was cautious but that he was manifestly incompetent and unable to properly construe the law himself. 178 Even worse,
John Randolph of Virginia, the nephew of Lee's cousin Theodorick
Bland (and thus a distant relation from the anti-Federalist branch of
the Lee family) 179 made an impassioned speech arguing that Lee had
opened the public fisc to extensive fraud by claimants from the Niagara frontier under the Act.
The United States ha[s] been-it is not worth while to mince the
matter-having been most shamefully and scandalously plundered,
under pretense of equitable claims, to the amount of some forty,
fifty, or sixty thousand dollars, every other man must be allowed to
put his lancet in and bleed the Treasury. If the public veins contained more blood than Leviathan himself ...it would not satisfy
them all .... [N]o man will say that the House is prepared to sup173. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 405 (1817).

174. Id.
175. HICKEY, supra note 34, at 35. There were, of course, some exceptions. John C. Calhoun,
for instance, favored firing Lee and retufning the adjudication of claims to Congress. 30 ANNALS OF CONG.392 (1817).

176. House of Representatives, BuFF.GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 1816, at 2.
177. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1816).

178. Id.
179. Fleming, supra note 14, at 19.
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port a continuation of these decisions on the same principle on
which some have been made by the Commissioner.' 80
Kentuckian Richard Mentor Johnson tried to defend Lee's reputation, saying that he had looked into his conduct and he "emphatically
testified to his capacity, to his integrity, to his fidelity, and to his character for honesty and intelligence."' 18' Thomas Grosvenor also tried
to salvage Lee's good name and the Act itself by insisting that the
problem was not Lee's construction of the law but that the perjured
testimony had not been "sufficiently scrutinized." Perhaps all that
was required to repair the situation was a "check on the reception of
testimony. ' 182 In that vein, Grosvenor proposed the modest modification to the Act of adding two additional commissioners to assist Lee in
policing the claimants' behavior. 83 Lee's antagonists were having
none of it. Randolph accused Lee of "malfaisance,"' 1 84 while Forsyth
claimed that he had personally investigated forty or fifty of Lee's decisions and at least thirty of them were decided on evidence so blatantly
false that a "person who would admit claims on evidence of this
description . . . was not to be trusted, and no revision could insure
correctness to his conduct." 185 Even Lee's supporters were eventually
driven by their desire to salvage the law itself to suggest his removal,
as did Robert Wright of Maryland, who conceded that "[i]f there was
any fault to the law of the last session-and he did not say there wasit was in the selection of a man for Commissioner who wanted
judgment.'"186
Finally, Lee couldn't stand it anymore and sent Clay a letter demanding that the House launch a formal inquiry into his conduct so
that at least he could be cleared of wrongdoing. He "defend[ed] his
decisions and particularly those three animadverted upon by the committee of claims in their report and [threw] himself upon the justice of
' 187
the House to rescue his character from unjust obloquy.
F.

Sympathy and Bureaucracy

In addition to supporting Lee and his liberal construction of the
Act,18 8 Clay and a few others-both Republican and Federalist180. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 387-88 (1816).
181. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 425-26 (1817).
182. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 390 (1816).

183. Id.
184. Id. at 388.
185. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 425 (1817).
186. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 371 (1816).
187. House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 1817, at 2.
188. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 378 (1816).
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voiced strong support for the structure of the claims commission itself
and the Congressional delegation of final adjudicatory authority to a
commissioner. Federalist Daniel Sheffey of Virginia responded to his
Republican colleague Henry St. George Tucker's allegation that it was
"prostrating the dignity of the House to divest themselves of the responsibility of deciding specially on claims" under the Act.1 8 9 Sheffey
said that "it was no disrespect to themselves to refer to a Commissioner the examination of small cases of sufferers in a war." 190 In an
animated speech, Clay argued that the commission structure was far
preferable to having such claims heard in the House itself, where
"[t]he right to be heard by petition in this House is in fact little more
than the right to have your petition rejected."' 191 Grosvenor agreed
with Clay that it was "undeniable" that Congress was "incompetent"
to deal with claims so that appointing a commissioner to handle them
was necessary. 192 Moreover, he noted that a Commissioner was more
likely to feel sympathy and identification with the victims he was
charged with aiding than was the Secretary of War or the House itself:
The [House] committee was a very safe one for the public.., they
were excellent hands to dash the cup from the parched lips of the
petitioners-parched indeed by suffering and distress-many of
whom had had their property destroyed, and others left orphans
and widows by the chances of war. When a member came with
these claims before that committee-they were honorable men, but
they were rigid-they had not only shut the door of the Treasury
against the claimants, but thrown the key into the ocean.' 93
Randolph disagreed and was "content to trust the Committee of
Claims. ' 194 Even if, however, the Committee was not the proper forum for the claims, Congress should delegate to a "responsible tribunal" rather than to a new organizational form like the Lee
1
Commission. 95
Despite Clay's support for delegating claims to a commissioner,
there was overwhelming support for modifying the bureaucratic structure of the Claims Commission to dilute or diminish Lee's power and
establish some checks on his discretion. Virginian Daniel Sheffey, a
Lee supporter, argued that even if Lee had exercised poor judgment,
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id at 381.
Id at 381-82.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 389.
Id.
30 ANNALS OF
Id. at 387.

CONG.

386 (1816).
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the correct remedy would be to "modify the administration of the
law" by placing
these claims in the same situation as all other demands against the
Government, which first pass under the scrutiny of the accounting
officers, and then undergo revision by the head of a department.
Such a control over the Commissioner would have, beside, the salutary effect of conforming his
decisions to the practice already estab96
lished in the department.'
Even a loyal Federalist like John Hulbert thought that Lee had gone
too far down the road of empathizing with the claimants and that it
would be best to turn the claims over to the additional accountant of
the War Department, Peter Hagner, whom Hulbert lavished with
praise. He did not support retaining Lee, "though he believed he was
a truly honorable man, [because Lee] possessed too much feeling to
'197
act as a Commissioner under that law."
A dizzying number of proposals and counter proposals were made,
including repealing the law, amending the law to require a narrow
construction of section 9,198 adding two additional commissioners, 199
creating some form of review of Lee's determinations either by the
head of Treasury (Crawford) or the head of War (Graham), assigning
adjudication to Peter Hagner and the War Department accountants,20 0 mandating that Lee appoint a commission that would take testimony in person (rather than accept affidavits) in every case over
$200 based on the "necessity of preventing the testimony, as by the act
it now was, from being exparte and unfair, and the necessity of providing against fraud and imposition," 20 1 providing for the appointment of
an agent to "examine witnesses on the part of the U. States, in cases in
196. Id. at 381.
197. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (1817).

198. The proposal by Rep. Ingham, which was ultimately adopted (see Claims' Law, Buff.
Gazette, Jan. 28, 1817, at 2) narrowed section 9 to cover only houses used as "a place of deposit
for munitions of war." The Claims Law &c., NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 1817, at 2. On the
other hand, William Henry Harrison, who had led troops in defending parts of the Niagara frontier, proposed an amendment that would have required a broad construction of section 9 such
that it included all the Buffalo claims and "entered into a particular and minute argument to
establish the expediency and justice of the relief to the cases which his proposition embraced."
However, he withdrew his amendment in deference to objections to retaining Lee in the role of
commissioner. The Claims Law, &c., NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 1817, at 2.
199. Wright proposed allowing the President to expand the commission to three commissioners rather than placing the adjudications under Hagner. Id.
200. Id. The proposal to place adjudication with Hagner and the War Department accountants, contained in the bill originally reported by the Committee of Claims back in December
1816 was opposed by a number of Representatives (Wright, Smith, and Pickering) who felt that
the war accountants would not actually be able to perform the additional duties as they were
already so overwhelmed that the department was reorganizing.
201. The Claims Law, &c., NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1817, at 3.
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which the President or Secretary of the Treasury shall think it necessary, ' 20 2 maintaining the law as it stood and ensuring that the Niagara
and Chesapeake claimants received compensation on the same terms
with previous claimants 20 3 and, as noted above, replacing Lee but
leaving the law itself intact.
On the final day of the Congressional session, March 3, 1817, the
Act of April 9, 1816 was amended to constrain Lee's discretion and
impose additional layers of bureaucratic control over the relief process. The new law: Mandated a narrow construction of the term "military deposite"; brought Lee under direct congressional oversight by
changing his role in outstanding cases to that of an investigator required to report to Congress rather than the ultimate decision-maker;
required Lee to appoint local commissioners to investigate all claims
over $200 and take testimony from witnesses under oath; recommended that Lee appoint a second set of commissioners "in all cases
where he shall adjudge the facts not to be sufficiently disclosed to allow a just decision between the claimants and the United States"; recommended the appointment of an agent to represent the interests of
the United States in claims adjudications in any cases where Lee
thought it proper to do so (that is, in Niagara); and gave Secretary of
War Graham the power to revise any claim decided by Lee for over
$200.204 In the end, Lee narrowly escaped removal, although as the
dismayed reporter for the Buffalo Gazette wrote, the amended law
"virtually takes from the commissioner of claims all his powers. '20 5
Residents of the Niagara frontier were stunned by these developments, which were reported in great detail on the front page of the
Buffalo Gazette. When the law had first come under attack in Congress, the editors had appeared unconcerned, commenting only that
the question of compensation was a difficult and relatively novel one,
and that "Congress will no doubt lay down more definite rules for the
decision of claims. ' 20 6 As debate progressed, the coverage became
more extended and also more anxious. On February 11, the paper
published a letter to the editor that lamented that the amendments
rendered the Act of April 9 a "dead letter as respects any beneficial

202. Claims Law, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 1817, at 2.
203. The Claims Law, &c., NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 1817, at 2.
204. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 110, 3 Stat. 397-98 (1817).
205. See Claims Law, BUFF. GAZETF, Jan. 28, 1817, at 2 (reporting House passage of the Act
of Mar. 5, 1817).
206. Washington, Dec. 7, BUFF. GAZEvrE, Dec. 24, 1816, at 2.
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operation in our cases," unless a separate relief bill for the Buffalo
claimants, then under consideration, were to pass. 20 7
This bill was the response of Congress to the December 20, 1816
petition of the Niagara claimants. Their memorial had been referred
to a select committee headed by the Representative from their district, Archibald Clarke. On January 23, after the conclusion of House
debate over the future of the Lee Commission made it clear that the
Buffalo and Lewiston claimants were going to have a very difficult
time obtaining compensation under the Act of April 9, Clarke's committee issued a report recommending some compensation. Acknowledging that not all of the homes were occupied within the meaning of
the Act of April 9, the committee felt still that this was "one of those
cases in which a generous and enlightened Government would step
'208
forward in aid of the sufferers.
Nevertheless, even this sympathetic committee treated the claimants as morally suspect, saying that for reasons "which need not be
stated, it would be improper to vote the whole amount of the actual
losses" forwarded to Lee, some $600,000. Rather, the committee recommended capping the damages at $340,000 to be divided proportionately among the claimants. 20 9 The bill also contained a collateral
source deduction for any relief payments previously made by the State
of New York, and appointed three commissioners to estimate the
value of the buildings and personal property. 210 This bill died a
speedy death in the House. Representative Forsyth argued that it was
a waste of time to discuss the matter and moved an amendment to
strike out the entire bill-as the Buffalo Gazette reported angrily, "in

effect to destroy

'

it. 211

A similar effort the following year led by

Henry Clay met the same fate. 21 2
The Buffalo Gazette had, of course, correctly perceived in February
1817 that the bureaucratized process that claimants would now face
rendered the law, if not a "dead letter," then at least a very sick one.

207. Niagara Claims: Extract from a Letter from a Gentleman at Washington, to His Friend in
This Village, Dated January24, 1817, BuFF.GAZETTE, Feb. 11, 1817, at 2.

208. 36

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS

507 (1817).

209. Id.
210. Niagara Claims, BuFF. GAZETTE, Feb. 11, 1817, at 2 (reprinting entire text of the bill
proposed by Clarke's committee).
211. Indemnity for War Losses, BuFF.GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 1817, at 1. Forsyth could not resist
first scoring some points, proposing an amendment to replace the bill with a substitute that
would appropriate $1 million for everyone in the country who had suffered losses by virtue of
military occupation, "the poorest individual to receive the largest sum in proportion to his loss."
Id.

212. See 36

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS

1698-1700 (1818).

603-04 (1818); 32 ANNALS

OF CONo.

1694-96,
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Richard Bland Lee did his best to continue to use his position to aid
the claimants in the few ways left to him under the new regime but he
repeatedly found himself hemmed in by the limits on his discretion.
Shortly after the amended law took effect, Lee wrote to Graham defending his broad interpretation of section 5 (which provided compensation for property taken for subsistence) to include both real and
personal property against the new Monroe administration's insistence
that it included only personal property. Lee offered various reasons
justifying his construction as valid legally and then argued, once again,
that he considered the "Law of the 9th of April 1816 as remedial and
[it] therefore ought to be construed liberally so as to promote and not
defeat the remedy intended-that is to say payment for the injuries
sustained by our citizens." 213 Strict construction might be proper for
penal laws "which always trench on private rights" but not here,
2 14
where the law was intended to distribute public benefits.
Lee also attempted to resist other of Graham's new directives, such
as the requirement that section 5 claims could no longer be approved
without the testimony of the officer who had ordered the property to
be taken, and the rule that no compensation would be awarded for
property destroyed or looted by the militia. After Graham told Lee of
these new rules, Lee wrote to him that in his view they were "too
rigorous" and would make it essentially impossible for claimants to
receive compensation "without producing any adequate additional security to the public. '215 This was particularly true, Lee argued, now
that Graham himself had the power to review all of his decisions over
$200 and could therefore exercise discretion himself, as Lee had done,
in determining whether to allow claims where the evidence was sufficient even if not in the "precise form" required by the law. 216 Lee saw
his job as "rendering substantial justice to the claimants and to the
nation." The best means of achieving that goal was a broad reading of
the law and the exercise of discretion in close cases. 217 What Lee had
failed to grasp, of course, was that the new rules were motivated by
the desire to police the process by avoiding precisely the exercise of
that discretion, whether by Lee or by Graham.
In addition to directly disputing the new rules, Lee tried other,
more subtle means of resisting the bureaucratization of the relief pro213. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Mar. 31, 1817, NARA, RG
217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent.
214. Id.
215. Letter, RBL to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, Apr. 30, 1817, NARA, RG
217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters Sent.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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cess. Pursuant to the new law, he appointed three commissioners to
go back to Niagara and rehear all the claims. However, in a probable
effort to spike the guns of members of the House who might attack
the veracity of local commissioners, he appointed two members of the
House who were strongly sympathetic to the claimants, Oliver Cromwell Comstock and Archibald Clarke (who had retired at the end of
the 14th Congress) as well as reappointing Stoddard, who had previously been a commissioner. He also appointed Jacob Dox to be a
Special Agent to represent the interests of the United States in the
proceedings before the Commissioners. Dox's official role was to try
to ferret out fraud in the claims, and in Lee's letter appointing him in
June 1817, he wrote "while on the one hand it appears to be the disposition of the government to afford full indemnification for real losses
sustained, so on the other you will perceive by the cautionary appointment of a special agent it is their expectation that every fraud or imposition on the nation will be effectively guarded against." 2 18 Dox
immediately realized that the effort to reinvestigate the claims was
futile given that the testimony regarding the valuation of property was
the same testimony given the prior year that had already been rejected as fraudulent. Therefore he decided that
Though my duty did not bide we devise for the claimants modes
and measures to be pursued by them to obtain indemnification still
as I felt convinced from the purpose of your instructions that the
government intends to afford full indemnifications for real losses
sustained and wished only to guard against fraud [and] imposition I
consented to and finally adopted the measure of selecting seven rejudgment to ascertain and report the
spectable persons of good
219
value of each building.
These appraisals were forwarded to Lee in the form of heavily crossreferenced and footnoted documentation that, on its face, seemed to
reflect a dispassionate bureaucratic treatment of the claims.2 20 Every
affidavit was signed: "Examined in my presence, Jacob Dox,
218. Letter, RBL to Jacob Dox, June 23, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
Sent.
219. Letter, Jacob Dox to RBL, Dec. 22, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection,
Box 17, Folder 3: Claims-War of 1812.
220. Letter, Jacob Dox to RBL, Dec. 2, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Entry 626: Lewiston Claims
(transmitting report of proceedings before Commissioners Stoddard, Comstock, and Clarke at
Lewiston). The report of the appraisers explains how they valued the property and includes a
detailed consideration of such things as "the prices of materials, mechanics, and the laborers
wages for several years previous to and subsequent to the late war, and have subjoined here into
an average value of building materials mechanics wages..." the different prices for houses made
of logs versus other materials such as mud and sticks, and making "suitable and reasonable
allowances for such age decay and for materials remaining after conflagration." Id.
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Agent."'22 1 This sort of documentation might survive review by newly
appointed Secretary of War John Calhoun and by Congress.
Unfortunately, Dox was forced to admit to Lee that despite his best
efforts he could not eliminate the fraud in the personal property
claims and he felt that he had no choice but to allow them because
they were substantiated by testimony. 22 2 The perjured testimony once
again threatened to doom both the claims and Lee personally. Worse,
an attorney in Ogdenburg had apparently written directly to Calhoun
informing him about massive fraud in the claims.2 23 Calhoun issued a
report regarding the status of all payments under the Act of April 9 on
February 20, 1818; that report described the continuing problem Lee
224
was having with fraudulent claims.
Lee responded a week later in a letter to Henry Clay by defending,
once again, his approach to the law. He transmitted Dox's thick report of the Lewiston and Buffalo claims, together with some additional evidence that he had taken from his files from the previous year
that he thought strengthened the case of the claimants. Lee argued
that the fact that most of the houses were occupied should be sufficient to justify relief even if some were not "within the strict letter of
the law." In terms of the valuation of household furnishings, Lee admitted that there might well be perjured testimony by neighbors conspiring to boost each others' awards, though he lamely offered that
"against the credibility of the parties nothing has been proved, nothing but vague suspicion alleged." Even if the claims were inflated,
however, Lee still felt they should be paid:
If however in some instances claimants may have received more
than they were entitled to in other instances they have received less
and in as much as the government does not want to pay interest on
unliquidated accounts and in many cases years have elapsed since
the destruction happened it is believed on the whole that as yet the
total sum does not exceed the total sum which the United States
225
undertook to pay.
Thus, Lee continued to advocate for a broad and sympathetic treatment for the claimants to the very end, even when it must have been
clear to him that his own reputation was suffering irreparable damage.
221. Id.
222. Letter, Jacob Dox to RBL, Dec. 22, 1817, NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection,
Box 17, Folder 3: Claims - War of 1812.
223. Letter, RBL to Alexander Richards, Esq., Jan. 21, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol.
1: Letters Sent.
224. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 590 (1818).

225. Letter, RBL to Henry Clay, Feb. 28, 1818, NARA, RG 217, Entry 623, vol. 1: Letters
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Indeed, the timing could not have been worse for Lee. The Act of
April 9 had authorized the Office of the Commissioner of Claims for
two years and was due to expire in a few weeks. Yet there were still
many undecided claims and a proposal had been made to extend the
term of the Act by a year. That proposal had been referred to the
Committee of Claims, which issued a report on March 11, 1818 excoriating the Niagara sufferers in the harshest possible terms. The Committee concluded that the claimants had perpetrated an extensive
"system of fraud, forgery, and perhaps perjury." Not only the claimants but also Lee for his "errors in judgment" and the law itself came
in for criticism. 226 The report concluded that all of the unresolved
cases, even if for small amounts, should be transferred to the War Department for adjudication, and recommended criminal prosecution of
the claimants. A few weeks later, Congress passed a law finally terminating Lee's office and transferring all of the outstanding claims to the
recently appointed Third Auditor of the Treasury Department, Peter
227
Hagner, for adjudication.
Hagner refused to take any further action or recommend that Congress pay the Niagara claims for nearly a decade despite the fact that
the claimants submitted memorial after memorial. 228 Newspaper editorials complained bitterly about the injustice to the unpaid claimants
from Niagara and elsewhere. 229 Finally, in 1825, Congress passed a
bill allowing the claimants to resubmit their claims to Hagner for adjudication, and requiring him to take additional evidence if necessary.
The bill capped the amount of compensation at $250,000, to be divided among the claimants proportionate to their losses. 2 30 The
claims were gathered together from various records in the House and
forwarded to Hagner for adjudication and payment. 23 1 Many of the
226. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 590 (1818).

227. Act of April 20, 1818, ch.124. The new law placed Hagner in Lee's position with respect
to the Niagara claims, requiring him to prepare reports and make recommendations to Congress
on all claims of over $200.
228. See, e.g., 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 613 (1818) (recommending against the petition of

Ralph Pomeroy); Memorial of the Inhabitants of Buffalo to Congress, Jan. 24, 1823, NARA, RG
217, Fred Manning Collection, Box 17, Folder 3; Memorial to the Senate and House from the
inhabitants of the town of Buffalo, undated [1818], NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection,
Box 17, Folder 3.
229. See, e.g., Laws of the U. States, NIAGARA PATRIOT, May 19, 1818, at 4. This editorial
complained that since the March 1817 amendments that stripped Lee of his discretion Congress
had failed to pay any of the claims from New Orleans or New York and that Hagner, despite his
(tactfully described) "integrity and competence" would do no better than Lee until the law was
"adapted more liberally to the distress & ruin brought on a few individuals in the country." Id.
230. Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 66.
231. The claims were transmitted by the Clerk of the House to Hagner's office for payment
with a note dated March 2, 1825, informing Hagner that the Buffalo and Lewiston claims had
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claimants who had been pressing their claims for a decade finally received compensation, including Gilman Fulsom, whose claim had set

in motion Madison's decision to change the interpretation of section 9,
and Pliny Field, who had been the named petitioner on the December
30, 1816 memorial.2 32 However, even after the Act of 1825, Hagner

apparently continued to apply a strict construction of the term "occupation" such that some of the claimants were turned down. 233 Moreover, at the request of the New York Comptroller's Office, Hagner
required that claimants who had received relief from the State of New
York at the time of the catastrophe had their claims subrogated for
the amount of that relief to the state. 234 Ironically for Lee, Hagner

later received a commendation from theSenate (along with a $1,000
235
cash bonus) for his service in settling the Niagara claims.
Richard Bland Lee left government service ruined, indebted, and
desperate. He left his family and emigrated to Kentucky, where he
been presented to the House separately and in groups for many years and were thus scattered
through the files of various members of the house. "A considerable effort has been made in
collecting them and the moment they are complete, shall be sent to your office." Letter, Clerk
of the House of Representatives to Peter Hagner, Third Auditor of the Treasury., Mar. 2, 1825,
NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection: Box 17, Folder 3.
232. Letter, W.L. Marcy to Richard Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, Aug. 3, 1825, NARA,
RG 217, Fred Manning Collection, Box 17, Folder 3: War of 1812-Claims. Marcy, the Comptroller of the State of New York wrote to Rush explaining that New York had initially given the
claimants a loan against their eventual awards from the Lee commission. When the Act of April
9 was suspended, the state had forgiven the loans on condition that the claimants assigned any
eventual awards up to that amount from the federal government to the state of New York. He
asked for an "arrangement" under which New York could collect the assigned amounts from the
Treasury directly. Marcy attached a list of the assignments by the Buffalo and Lewiston claimants showing the amount assigned to the state for each. A transcribed list in the file from 1878
seems to indicate that most of the Buffalo and Lewiston claimants were paid (including Gilman
Fulsom, Ralph Pomeroy, and Pliny Field). See Untitled Document, NARA, RG 217, Fred Manning Collection: Box 17, Folder 3 (1878 transcription of Buffalo and Lewiston claimants paid
under the Act of March 3, 1825 with notation "State NY paid under this act and were reimb. By
U.S. when payments [sic] made under Act 3-3-25 amending act 4-9-16 - Prop Lost War 1812 3rd
Aud made awards and papers in RBLee file 1st Aud making payments under act 25").
233. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 55 (1854) (recommending against the claim of Eunice Gilbert of
Buffalo because her house was not occupied at the time of its destruction). Gilbert was the
widow of John Gilbert and though his name appears on the list transcribed in 1878 it does not
show a voucher number nor an assignment to the State of New York, so it is probable that he
was not paid in 1825. H.R. REP. No. 57 (1854) (recommending against the claim of James Duckett of Maryland for property destroyed by the enemy because it was not used by the American
army at the time of its destruction).
234. Letter, W.L. Marcy to Richard Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, Aug. 3, 1825, NARA,
RG 217, Fred Manning Collection, Box 17, Folder 3: War of 1812-Claims.
235. See An Act Making Compensation to Peter Hagner, Third Auditor of the Treasury Department, ch. 102, 6 Stat. 369 (1827); S.103, 19th Cong. (2d Sess. 1827) (entitled "A Bill Making
Compensation to Peter Hagner"). This was in addition to the $500 provided to Hagner under
the Act of March 3, 1825 to compensate him for the additional duty of settling the 1812 war
claims.
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lived until he was able to wheedle an appointment from President
Monroe to be a judge of the District of Columbia Orphan's Court in
1819. Then, in 1825, still in debt, he wrote again to the long-retired
Madison begging him to help Lee get appointed as clerk of the Su'236
preme Court, a plea that a Lee family biographer called "pathetic.
At the end of his life, Lee held a pessimistic view of government
and politics; he despised the rise of Jacksonian Democracy, which he
likely saw as antithetical to his notion of wise and benevolent
2 37
government.
IV.

FROM VICTIMS TO RECIPIENTS:
WAR OF

SPOILED IDENTITIES IN THE

1812

The experience of claimants in the War of 1812, and of Richard
Bland Lee himself, is an object lesson in how the compensation process itself can spoil identities in the course of turning virtuous victims
into untrustworthy recipients. The travails suffered by Lee-who
never wavered from a sympathetic and expansive view of claimants,
even as others distanced themselves-are the best indicator of this
transformation. At the beginning of his term, Lee took a broad and,
to his lights at least, compassionate view of the mandate that Congress
had given him. This was consistent with the mood of Congress when it
passed the bill: the plight of those on the front lines of the war was
desperate and it had activated the charitable impulses of the nation.
The law was meant to offer immediate relief to suffering victims; thus,
little in the way of a bureaucratic apparatus of verification was needed
or desired. Instead, the law provided for a relief commissioner who
was to be little more than a distribution channel. Had Lee insisted on
narrow criteria of eligibility and a heavily bureaucratized process for
assessing evidence and determining awards ("red tape" in today's vernacular), he would likely have been subjected to a severe attack in the
press and in Congress. At this early moment, claimants like those on
the Niagara frontier who had endured a terrible ordeal possessed a
clear moral virtue, and Lee would have been ill-advised to swim
against the tide. Madison and Secretary of War Crawford, responding
to the same pressures, initially supported Lee's generous construction
of section 9.
The relative success of the Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Virginia claimants over those on the Niagara frontier, in Kentucky, Louisiana, and remote areas of the Chesapeake Bay, demonstrates the
236. NAGEL, supra note 20, at 186.
237. Id.
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advantages that attach to claimants at the earliest stage of the compensation process. Claimants who were geographically closer to the
Commission were the first to be heard and compensated, and hence
exited the compensation system before the process of identity transformation had taken hold. Claimants residing nearer to Washington
also had the advantage of being able to reinforce their victim status to
Congress and the commission personally, and to display directly the
loss of property that they had suffered. Thus, Baltimore, which had
been destroyed nearly as thoroughly as Buffalo, had been quickly
compensated by a special act of Congress, while claimants from the
west and north had to contend with the attenuation caused by time
and space.
This fact was well understood by congressmen from outlying areas
who inveighed against the suspension or repeal of the Act of April 9
because their sections had not yet presented their claims, while others
"who from the convenience of their situation" had already been
paid. 238 "What sort of justice would it be," they asked, if the Niagara
claimants were denied the same relief offered to others? 239 Thomas
Boiling Robertson of Louisiana argued that "though many claims
have been decided nearer the seat of government ....
In regard to
the state of Louisiana, not a single claim had yet come before the
commissioner; and [he] was not, therefore, disposed to arrest the proceedings of the commissioner at the moment the distant claims might
be expected to present themselves. '240 Benjamin Hardin of Kentucky
was even more blunt: the law's title would have been more appropriate, he said, "had it been called a bill for the benefit of the District of
24
Columbia.", 1
Lee's subsequent difficulties with Congress were due to his failure
to anticipate that the claimants' identity as blameless victims was temporary, and in fact, would be undermined by the very process of compensation that he was administering. 242 Lee was excoriated in
238. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 381 (1816).

239. Id.
240. Congressional: House of Representatives, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 16, 1816, at 2.

241. Id.
242. As noted above, it is clear from the congressional debate on this subject that the attack
on Lee was not motivated by partisan political considerations-i.e., orchestrated by Republicans
because he was a Federalist-though it may be seen in some sense as ideological. His biggest
supporters were Republican War Hawks such as Clay, Robertson, Wright, and Johnson, while
his biggest attackers were Old Republicans who favored simple government and felt that
Madison and Clay had adopted too many Federalist policies. Moreover, while he had some
Federalist defenders such as New York's Grosvenor and Vermont's Sheffey, in general the Federalists in Congress did not rush to his aid, as the remarks of John Hulbert that he felt Lee was
too compassionate for the job amply illustrates.
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Congress for excessive generosity-as in his decision to credit the Buffalo claimants' estimates of the value of their lost household
goods 243-but his actual sin was to remain constant in his approach to
claimants as they were transformed from victims to recipients. At the
beginning of the process, Lee's willingness to credit the statements of
"victims," to broadly construe key statutory terms like "occupation,"
and to essentially waive requirements of proof, in order to hasten the
distribution of aid looked entirely appropriate-indeed he was mandated by statute to foster a "more speedy execution" of the Act and to
"proceed with all practicable despatch." Even more important, the
statute directed him to pay as much regard to the "claims of individual
justice as to the interest of the United States."
Later, when the Niagara claims had made their way to Washington
for adjudication, Lee's "bearing on the side of poverty and wretchedness" came to seem credulous and naive, not necessarily because mistakes or instances of fraud came to light, but because the prospect of
receiving compensation turned claimants into a group whose identity
was dominated by self-interest and the potential for sharp dealing.
Because Lee, unlike Madison-who correctly interpreted the political
transformation and changed his mind on the construction of section
9-continued to advocate for generous payments, his own identity became spoiled by association.
Congress's solution to the discrediting of the claimants, and by association Lee, is instructive. Rather than replacing Lee, or repealing the
compensation law entirely, Congress amended it in order to strip Lee
of his unreviewable discretion and to impose an unwieldy bureaucratic
process that was certain to replace generosity with distrust. This imposition was a shift to a defensive posture towards claimants, treating
them now as dangerously self-interested. Congress even recommended in the amended law that where the evidence appeared inadequate, Lee was to appoint a second round of local investigators, as
well as a counter-commissioner (Jacob Dox) who was responsible for
sallying forth to actively undermine claims in defense of the public
fisc. In Goffman's terms, the status of claimant had, by March 1817,
become so stigmatized that it justified a skeptical response. Ultimately, this stigmatization was so thoroughgoing that Congress's
amendment to the original act rendered it "a dead letter. ' 244 The entire process was turned over to Third Auditor, Peter Hagner, who required strict proof of every loss, interpreted every term of the statute
243. 36 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 590 (1818).
244. Niagara Claims: Extractfrom a Letter from a Gentleman at Washington, to His Friendin
This Village, Dated January 24, 1817, BUFF.GAZETrE. Feb. 11, 1817, at 2.
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as narrowly as possible, and refused to pay the Niagara claims until
ordered to reconsider them by an act of Congress in 1825.
V.

RELIEVING SEPTEMBER 11TH

"You've lost your fucking mind," Feinberg exclaimed. "This guy
should file a suit."
"He might-you're giving him every reason to," the lawyer replied
calmly.
"I want him to!" Feinberg said. "And do me a favor-hold a press
conference. Say I wouldn't give the guy sixteen million dollars-tax
free!"245

A.

The Victim Compensation Fund as Disaster Relief

The history of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 is strikingly similar to that of the commission for the relief of the
victims of the War of 1812, although we have obviously not yet seen
the VCF through to its end. As in the earlier case, the VCF legislation
envisioned the task as distributing relief to a population that had suffered grievous losses through no fault of its own. The statute was
vague and ambiguous, 246 perhaps deliberately so, suggesting that no
one in Congress saw political benefit in tightening eligibility criteria or
in placing too heavy an administrative burden on the Special Master.
Feinberg, like Lee, was given a nearly blank slate upon which to write
eligibility criteria, claims procedures, and standards for determining
the amount of compensation due to claimants.2 4 7 And Feinberg, like
Lee, emphasized the victim status of the claimants from the beginning.
The New York Times reported that both Feinberg and Attorney General John Ashcroft would put the needs of victims "ahead of the ultimate expense to taxpayers. '248 Feinberg and Ashcroft initially
proposed a streamlined, nonadversarial process for distributing cash
to victims as quickly as possible, as did the Act of April 9, 1816249 and,
245. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator. How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value of Three
Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 2002, at 42.

246. For instance, the Act delegates nearly total discretion to the Special Master who is instructed to promulgate "all procedural and substantive rules" for the program, and who is to
make final and unreviewable determinations of both eligibility and the amount of compensation
for each claimant "based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual
circumstances of the claimant." Tom Brune, Feinberg To Head Victim Compensation Fund,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 2001, at A5.
247. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§§ 404(a)(2), 405(b), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).

248. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Mediator Named To Run Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at B1.

249. Id.
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again like Lee, were willing to loosen even their flexible rules when
necessary to provide relief.
For example, Feinberg eased the compensation calculation rules for
firefighters when it appeared that they would be excluded from benefits because of the range of other resources available to them, and
guaranteed that everyone would get something despite the statutorily
required collateral source deductions that would seem to demand a
different result. 250 Feinberg, in this instance, was simply "erring on
the side of wretchedness and poverty" by liberally interpreting the
law, just as Lee did in relaxing the rules regarding the retaliatory destruction of property by British soldiers. This, as Representative
Grosvenor argued nearly two hundred years ago, is the key rationale
for a thin bureaucratic structure-to ensure that the government has
sufficient flexibility to make particularistic determinations to "award
payment to some poor wretch, whose misfortune it would be that his
loss, equally grievous with others, did not come within the nice techni251
calities of the law."
The public and the press clearly approved Feinberg's solicitude toward the victims, at least in the initial aftermath of the attacks. In one
of the most striking, if saccharine, examples, the New York Times published a story on Christmas Eve 2001 that quoted "the city's poorest
people" voicing "clarion sympathy, hard as metal and tempered by
experience, for those who suffered most keenly on September 11th."
Sally Young, a Bronx slum dweller was "galled" by the idea that a
"white-collar widow might be brought down low enough to live in her
neighborhood in the Bronx, near the soup kitchen. The widow would
'252
be unprepared.
As with relief for the War of 1812, this happy state of moral clarity
is not necessarily a lasting one. As September 11th claimants proceed
through the process of formulating their claims, negotiating compensation, and receiving payments, they too will trace the arc from victim
to recipient, and, hence, risk the collapse of their moral status from
deserving to worthy of suspicion and distrust. There are certainly direct signs of this transformation at work in public perceptions of the
September 11th claimants. News articles (including a cover story in
the New York Times Magazine by Lisa Belkin, 253 and a long piece on
250. Elissa Gootman, Seeing Families, Senator Calls For Changes in Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at B2; Diana B. Henriques, The FederalFund Official Vows All Familiesof
Victims Will Get Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B7.
251. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
252. Sheila K. Dewan, Among the Poor, Sympathy for the Families of Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 24, 2001, at B1.
253. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92.
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upper class suburban widows in Vanity Fair by Gail Sheehy 254) point
out the privileged economic situation of many of the claimants, and
the funds that they have already received from other sources, such as
the Red Cross and other private charities.
The public comments on Feinberg's proposed rules for calculating
compensation also provide a startlingly clear index to this shift.255
The comments began on November 6, 2001, a day after the Department of Justice issued its Notice of Inquiry and Advance Notice of
Rulemaking, 56 with an outpouring of sympathy and demands for
massive and practically limitless compensation. One writer complained about the failure of the Red Cross to distribute all of the
money it had received directly to the victims, and said that, although
he was not wealthy, he wanted the government to
publish a validated list of names and addresses and my wife and I
will see what we can do to come up with something additional to
help. The aid situation is a travesty but that should not deter our
steadfast determination to truly bring 257
whatever relief we can muster
to the victims of the Sep. 11 attacks.
Others urged the government to set up lavish trust funds, for example, "[a]t least three million dollars for each victim ... to be given to
family members. ' 2 58 Many more expressed outrage over Congress's
decision to require the deduction of collateral sources from the
2 59
awards, and urged that that part of the legislation be repealed.
Some argued that the Fund should be opened to virtually everyone
254. Gail Sheehy, "September Widows," 9/11-One Year Later .
at http://www.gailsheehy.com/9 11/9_llOYLindex.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
255. Of course, the comments are not any sort of a random or representative sample of American opinion and I am not making any claims for them in that regard. Nevertheless, the comments were submitted-like quotes in newspapers and editorials-by people who felt strongly
enough about their position to spend time and resources offering it. It is the change over time in
the run of the comments that I am here concerned with-the fact that expressions of sympathy
decreased while expressions of contempt for the perceived greed of the survivors rose.
256. 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901 (Nov. 5, 2001).
257. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000001.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
258. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000015.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
W000004.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
259. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001
(individual comment), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000007.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000017.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); but see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcom-
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who lost anything in the attacks, such as the unemployed, those in
260
need of psychological counseling, and even people who lost pets.
The public seemed to be asking the government, in the words of one
writer, to "[p]lease make the eligibility rules as liberal as possible.
2 61
Spread this money far and wide. There is enough for everyone.
Significantly, some writers demanded the suspension or elimination
of all ordinary bureaucratic requirements, such as filling out forms or
providing documentation of losses, in order to expedite the distribution of funds.
They should not have to fill out an endless bureaucratic form. The
form should have the name, address, SSAN, phone number, and
show how connected to the deceased, plus the attached death certificate, and little else. Get that money to them as fast as possible.
Some of these people are having severe financial difficulties ....
Give these people the benefit of the doubt on the front end; an
honors system .... Don't get into all of this determination stuff,
"the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual
circumstances of the claimant." Forget it. That's old bureaucratic
hogwash. These people need immediate help. They don't need to
run through some legalistic mine field invented by some old stuffed
shirt, who
doesn't fully realize the pain these people are going
2 62
through.
Others echoed the sense that norms of verification for other sorts of
welfare benefits and governmental aid were somehow improper or
263
disrespectful in this context.
Even the minority of writers who did question the efficacy of the
Fund at this early stage generally sounded tentative and equivocal in
their criticisms and voiced effusive sympathy for the victims. Thus,
one correspondent from New Jersey was careful to begin his letter by
pensation/W000008.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (urging the deduction of charitable
donations as collateral sources).
260. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationW0O0o016.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
261. Id.
262. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000032.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). Despite the fact that many of these letters, including this one, are somewhat
cranky or idiosyncratic, the broad themes in the pool of letters are quite consistent: deep sympathy for the victims driving demands for massive government aid, coupled with somewhat more
limited calls for equity of award amounts (though primarily advocating leveling claims up to the
highest level rather than downward to the level of need).
263. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000002.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF
2001 (individual comment), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000035.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
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noting that he "felt the same horror and sympathy for the victims and
families as many Americans did," and that the writer had personally
contributed to charitable relief funds. Moreover, the writer stated
that he did support government relief to "soften the blow that these
families took"; he merely questioned whether "in the absence of real
need" the government's money could be better spent on "ALL Americans" for such things as national security and social programs. The
letter concluded that the government should "provide for the true
needs of the families but [not] just give away tax money in a mis264
guided and hopeless attempt to equate dollars with empathy."
Much changed after the December 21, 2001 release of the Interim
Final Rule. In particular, the publication of Feinberg's grid relating
compensation to factors such as income and age of the victim led to
the announcement that the family of each victim would receive an
average of approximately $1.6 million. By January 2002, the calls to
"spread this money far and wide" were gone. Instead, the public comments were often little more than bitter screeds accusing the families
of unbridled greed, an accusation that had not previously appeared in
any letter.
A search of the Justice Department's database containing these
comments serves to sharpen the point: The Justice Department received 6,263 comments in response to its Notice of Inquiry and Advance Notice of Rulemaking. Out of those, not a single comment
contained the words "greed" or "greedy." After the issuance of the
Interim Final Rule and the publication of the grid, the Justice Department logged 6,268 comments. Of these, 201 writers (95 using the word
"greed" and 106 using the word "greedy") directly accused the families of self-interest. Even more revealing was a search for the word
"taxpayer" which yielded 2,237 comments, only approximately five
percent of which were submitted prior to the release of the grid.
Nearly all of the comments that referred to taxpayers were critical of
the victims and the Fund. Some typical examples:
As a U.S. taxpayer, I do NOT want those victims whose families
were in the million dollar income (or anywhere near it) to be recipients of the funds appropriated by Congress. Let THEM scale down
265

264. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (indi-

vidual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W0000019.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003).
265. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/PO00028.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
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1 am appalled at the attitude of the victims families. The help they
are receiving from taxpayers is not a right but compensation for
their suffering.
It is a gift that I believe at this point amounts to
2 66
welfare.

While these are admittedly rough estimates, they serve to illustrate my
point. There was a dramatic increase in the proportion of writers who
characterized the claimants as self-interested recipients seeking "welfare" rather than as blameless victims after the release of the grid.
In a typical comment, an Oklahoma writer noted in a January 28,
2002 letter that "people are not entitled to become instant millionaires
simply because they are also victims of world-wide sympathy. '26 7
Many seemed driven to comment by their outrage at the widows and
family members who appeared on television to denounce Feinberg
and the amount that they would receive under the grid. As one writer
complained, "I am continuing to hear stories about the survivors of
the victims from September 11th and how they are not be [sic] fairly
treated . . .they haven't received any money from the charities or

from this fund.., when is it coming.., and so on."'2 68 Another writer
from Berkeley, California agreed, saying that she had watched Feinberg and a victim's advocate debate on Newshour, and, "I have to say
I disagree with you about whether the victims' families are greedy. I
truly believe some of them are, particularly people such as the representative on today's discussion. '269
Another writer bluntly declared that "[tihis fund is a scam for those
people involved in the WTC terrorist attack. '2 70 One wrote of being
"stunned" by a Time magazine article that quoted a widow calling
266. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N002214.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). While the preponderance of opinion shifted after the publication of the
Interim Rule, the degree of emotional content remained constant. As the excerpts here illustrate, writers invested their reactions with a great deal of feeling. Goffman's work suggests that
behind such public displays, whether celebrating the good or disparaging stigma, lies the universal anxiety that none of us is fully virtuous, and that in reinforcing the boundary between blameworthy and blameless we act to shore up our own standing in the eyes of others and of ourselves.

267. U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF

2001 (indi-

vidual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan28/
N002250.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
268. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/njan22/N002294.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (ellipses in original).
269. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/postinterim/pfeb11/
P000437.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
270. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/postinterim/pfeb05/
P000148.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).

346

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:289

Feinberg's proposed award of $1.5 million a "sick joke" that made her
want to "throw up."'27 1 Accusations of greed were ubiquitous, particularly following the victims' numerous public denunciations of Feinberg's grid. As one commenter put it, "the greed is appalling. ' 272 A
writer from Roswell, Georgia bitterly attacked both the Final Rule
and the claimants, saying that "[t]hese people that keep asking for
more money always say it is not about the money. OK, if that is the
case ... say no to the money and go away. The way I see it is... 'IT
273
IS ALL ABOUT THE MONEY."
Disgust over the comparatively generous treatment afforded the
September 11th families was particularly acute. 2 74 One commenter,
who claimed to be the widow of a Vietnam veteran who had recently
died as a result of his exposure to Agent Orange, wrote that although
she did not "begrudge them help," she was
offended at the rhetoric, that somehow the families who survived
September 11 have had more suffering than others who have lost
271. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/njan07/NO0l029.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
272. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/njan09N001415.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationfN000878.html (last visited Oct. 31,2003) ("How greedy can a person be!!!"); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N000713.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003)
("These people do not deserve this money."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/P000216.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("Listening to some of them complain
because they aren't going to get any money from the government is absolutely ridiculous."); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/P000196.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2003) ("I contend that it is the victims themselves that are responsible for their own families
well-being, it's called life insurance."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/P000158.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("Let us not give in to greed."); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N002209.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003)
("I feel that greed has come into play here."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (individual comment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N001370.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("I am troubled by the greed of other
Americans.").
273. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (Mar. 8,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/final/rmarl2/R000011.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
274. 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,236-38 (Mar. 13, 2002) (noting that several commentators on the
Interim Final Rule had "expressed their regret that victims of other tragedies were not given the
same benefit of compensation," while others had "argued that the calculations were too generous and suggested changes, the effect of which would decrease awards").
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loved ones ....I am busy doing what these wives should be doing:
getting on with taking care of my family, taking classes, working
harder, and picking up the pieces. I haven't had the time to be lobbying in Washington DC, or doing interviews. We aren't promised
that there will never be disasters in our lives. Others have gone
2 75
through it. Most survive!"
Another mother of two children titled her comment "I JUST
DON'T BELIEVE IT," and wrote that
surely these people need financial help, but does the life of one of
the victims in the WTC warrant more value then [sic] the little girl
that was killed by a drunk driver? Do the lives of all the survivors
of fires and earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and many
other disasters not warrant some form of life long financial freedom
as the government is giving to the WTC surviving family members?
...I was under the impression all Americans were created equal,
then why do these people deserve to become millionaires more then
any other surviving family member of any other disaster? 276
Hundreds of writers echoed these sentiments, mentioning not only
Oklahoma City and the African embassy bombings but also various
natural disasters. Many of the writers speculated that it was only because the victims of September 11th were rich and powerful compared
to other victims that the VCF was created in the first place, such as
one commenter, who theorized that "they are getting money because
they are the movers and shakers of [W]all [S]treet vs. the good old
'27 7
boys from Oklahoma.
The questions raised by the public comments about the relative desert of other claimants began to appear in the media.2 78 Indeed, by
May 2002, the press was reporting that Congress had reached a deal
that would open the Fund to the victims of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the African em-

275. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan08/N01173.html
(last

visited Oct. 31, 2003).
276. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (Jan. 7,

2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan09/NOOl431.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003).
277. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (Jan. 22,
2002) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interimlnjan28/NO02248.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003).
278. Marc Lacey, World Briefing Africa: Kenya: Don't Forget Us, Bomb Victims Say. N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at A16; Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001,
at B8; John Wilkins, The Other Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1. 2002, at A20: Robert Worth, Ground
Zero: Compensation; Families of Victims Rally for Higher FederalAwards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2002, at B4.
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bassy bombings. 279 Although White House opposition to the retroactive extension of the VCF killed the effort in the Senate after House
passage, 280 support in the polity remains strong for what Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle's spokeswoman called "an appropriate ex'2 81
tension of the fund.
B.

Negotiating the Moral Economy of DisasterRelief

The trajectory traced by claimants from victims to recipients is fundamentally a moral one: claimants are transformed from virtuous to
grasping, from deserving of charity to worthy of suspicion. My key
argument here is that this trajectory is given in the nature of compensation itself. But from the perspective of claimants and relief officials,
this trajectory appears as a practical problem that grows more pressing over time: how to avoid being soiled by the impending money
transaction. In Goffman's terms, this is a problem of how to avoid the
collapse of a discreditable (but still publicly virtuous) identity into a
discredited one. For claimants, this collapse threatens their ability to
collect compensation, and more broadly, their social standing and reputation. For officials, this collapse threatens their reputation for being
realistic, reliable, and prudent stewards of political and bureaucratic
resources, and hence the likelihood that they will be trusted with such
matters again.
Although their perils spring from the same source, claimants and
officials are led to diverging and ultimately opposing strategies in response. Relief officials can respond to the transformation of victims
into recipients by fighting back in an effort to reinforce their victimhood and refill the well of sympathy that motivated the relief in
the first place. Richard Bland Lee chose this strategy in dealing with
Presidents Madison and Monroe as well as the War and Treasury Departments, but he ultimately failed to make a convincing case that the
claimants, particularly those from the Niagara frontier, could be
trusted. Instead, he diminished his own credibility and ultimately lost
control of the compensation process.
279. Shaila Dewan, Traces of Terror: Compensation; Accord to Let Other Victims of Terror
Receive Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2002, at All; Raymond Hernandez, Traces of Terror: Compensation; Changes to Sept. II Fund Would Extend Aid to Victims of Past Terror Bombings, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A22.

280. Chris Casteel, Aid Sought for City Bombing Victims, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 23, 2002,
at 1.
281. Raymond Hernandez, Traces of Terror: Compensation; Changes to Sept. 11 Fund Would
Extend Aid to Victims of Past TerrorBombings, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A22; see also Nolan
Clay, Bombing Victims Rally for More Aid: Fair DistributionSought from Terrorist Relief Fund,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 31, 2002.
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Kenneth Feinberg, by contrast, appears to have chosen another, and
probably more successful, strategy: over time, he has opted to treat
the claimants as recipients of a federal benefit program subject to bureaucratic procedures grounded in calculation and verifiability rather
than emotion and sympathy. That this approach has produced outraged protest on the part of claimants is, from this perspective, all to
the good, as it demonstrates to onlookers that that the relief official is
sufficiently independent of claimants to protect the public fisc. Perhaps for this reason, Feinberg has not avoided public encounters with
hostile victim's groups, which give him an opportunity to express compassion yet also be seen as the target of rage and disappointment by
282
claimants.
Claimants, by contrast, have no similar way to distance themselves
from their own claims. They therefore face a more restricted set of
options: they must hold on to their status as victims, or risk losing
their reputations and their awards. Hence, claimants turn to repeated
narratives of loss and nearly always object to bureaucratic procedures
as hardhearted and insufficiently nuanced to capture the reality of the
disaster that has befallen them. The resulting conflict between relief
officials and claimants is a characteristic feature of disaster relief, at
least in the American context.
We need not look far to find claimants narrating their losses in order to counter suggestions of self-interest. One widow wrote to the
New York Times Magazine after a cover story in December 2002 alluded to the financial payoff claimants would receive:
You could not have scheduled a more inopportune time to publish
this article. My husband Steve was killed on Sept. 11, and I, like
many of the widows and families, am struggling through the season
that is so full of memories. I was still in shock last Christmas and
adrenaline alone must have got [sic] me through the holidays. This
year, however, the numbness has worn off, and I am feeling the intense, raw pain. If it weren't for my young children, I would probably curl up and hide until2 83January. Your article drove a stake
through my grieving heart.
The most potent threat to the identity of claimants, however, is not
occasional media articles but the compensation process itself. The
more clearly the process is about money, the harder it is for claimants
282. A Better Deal for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A20; Lisa Belkin, Just Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92; Elissa Gootman, In Last Days for Comment,
Victims' Fund Is Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at B4; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42, 45; Sheehy, supra note 254; Lena Sun & Jacqueline Salmon,
Sept. 11 Funds Wrestle with What's Fair: Disparities Pit Survivor Groups Against Each Other,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2001, at Al.

283. Tomoko Schlag, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 8.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:289

to navigate it successfully. Thus, Feinberg's introduction of the "grid"
to calculate awards based on standardized criteria, such as the victim's
age and income, produced a sharp reaction from a vocal set of claimants, just as residents of the Niagara frontier reacted strongly to Congress's tightening of eligibility requirements in March 1817.
The grid poses two problems from the perspective of claimants: It
distracts attention from the event that caused the loss in the first
place, and therefore from the status of claimants as victims; and it is
clearly about money. The most common objection by claimants to the
grid is that it obliterates the singularity of loss in the service of making
claims, and, hence, victims, commensurable with each other. 284 The
grid is not about how people died, but about their financial resources
and responsibilities. This commensurability is, of course, the hallmark
of the central bureaucratic process of turning individual persons and
events into "cases" that can be subjected to standardized procedures.
In this regard the grid is nearly overwhelming in its focus on how personal characteristics translate into money awards. The tables themselves are a sea of dollar signs with large numbers attached.
Feinberg's metric for compensation highlights a fact that is inevitable but that claimants would prefer to shroud as long as possible: all
of the claimants will ultimately see their individual circumstances reduced to a dollar amount, and with it will see themselves transformed
into recipients for whom the salient characteristic is "how much?" In
drawing attention to the fact that claimants will eventually get paid, it
invites comparison to other recipients of government funds whose
identities have already been spoiled by their status, as the public comments comparing the September 11th claimants to welfare recipients
demonstrate. As one economist, critical of Feinberg, said in the New
York Times, in terms that surely struck fear in the hearts of victims'
families, "this is not a compensation package-it is a welfare
package." 2 85

284. Elissa Gootman, In Last Days for Comment, Victims' Fund Is Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2002, at B4; Diana Henriques, Ideas and Trends: In Death's Shadow, Valuing Each Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 10; Robert Worth, Ground Zero: Compensation;
Families of Victims Rally for Higher FederalAwards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B4.
285. Henriques, supra note 284, at 10. Similarly, many public comments on the Interim Final
Rule expressly contrasted the 9-11 fund with other government programs, as did this writer who
asked "why these 'survivors-of-victims' will receive, in effect a lifetime of handouts when our
federal law has explicitly stated that welfare has a 5-year lifetime eligibility limit. Why isn't there
a 5-year limit on this 'welfare' program too?" U.S. Dep't of Justice, September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan23/N001839.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
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While the use of the grid insulates Feinberg against charges of having "gone native" with the claimants, it leaves claimants themselves in
286
the difficult position of maintaining that "it's not about the money"
when everyone knows that each claimant already has an expected
award amount, and indeed, that families are increasingly feuding
amongst themselves over the payouts. 287 Even the New York Times,
which had been generally quite sympathetic to the claimants, noted in
an editorial after the grid was released that "[p]redictably, just about
all the families thought they should be getting more. ' 288 Not surprisingly, the grid was the subject of more public comments than any
other topic connected to Feinberg's proposed regulations or the VCF
2 89
itself.
C. Strategy and Tactics in Claimant Responses
As noted above, claimants have one basic strategy to draw on in
countering the identity spoiling that is built into the compensation
process: reinforcing their status as victims rather than recipients. This
strategy has various tactical expressions, however, several of which are
clearly present in the September 11th case. These can be loosely
grouped as: (1) emphasizing claimants' blamelessness; (2) displaying
features other than victimhood that are inconsistent with the recipient
status (what Goffman terms "disidentifiers"); (3) focusing the stigma
associated with the recipient status onto another group (which thereby
becomes a kind of scapegoat); and (4) insisting on the inability of the
compensation process to fully ameliorate the loss, and hence to blot
out the victim status.
Blamelessness is a key narrative resource for claimants because it
connects them to what has been the core logic of relief for over two
centuries in the American context, as I have noted above and (more
extensively) elsewhere: people who have suffered loss through no
fault of their own deserve compensation, while those who bear responsibility for their own deprivation deserve little or nothing, no
matter what their need. In responding to charges of greed, blamelessness allows claimants to remind others that they did not choose to
suffer the loss for which they are seeking compensation, and in fact
286. Belkin, supra note 2, at 92.
287. David Barstow & Diana Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Families; Gifts to Rescuers Divide Survivors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; David Chen, Lure of Millions Fuels 9/11
Families' Feuding, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at Al; Sun & Salmon, supra note 282.
288. Editorial, Putting a Value of Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24. 2002. at A26.
289. See September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11.233,
11,236 (Mar. 13, 2002).
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would gladly give up the money if they could thereby restore the status quo ante. Claims of blamelessness are thus an effort to, in effect,
extend to the compensation process the lack of agency that characterized the claimants' relation to the catastrophe. Statements by claimants that they are overwhelmed and confused by the compensation
process (as reported by Kenneth Feinberg, even unable to "put pen to
paper" to fill out the forms) 290 can be seen in the same vein, as an
effort to maintain a passive and hence distanced relation from the
seeking of relief.
A second tactical approach is to highlight disidentifiers-facts that
are inconsistent with the stigmatized status and, hence, subverting of
the stigmatized identity. 291 Blameless victimization is itself such a disidentifier: if a claimant can be shown to have had no advance knowledge of a calamity, and even no reason to anticipate its possibility,
then it is unlikely that his status as a recipient reflects an underlying
moral deficit. The September 11th victims have a strong asset in this
regard, because few could have anticipated the attacks. Another disidentifying characteristic for the recipient status is affluence. An affluent claimant is taken to be less likely to be motivated by greed then
a poor claimant. Hence, the otherwise paradoxical fact that the most
effective spokesmen for the claimants are not those who are obviously
in need, but those whose needs seem less obvious. Claimants from
leafy green suburbs who stand in line in expensive clothes do not bear
the marks of the typical welfare recipient and, hence, lend some plausibility to the claim that "it's not about the money."
A third possible defense to the discrediting tendencies of the recipient status is displacing and concentrating the moral stain onto another
group, leaving the body of claimants relatively less morally suspect.
Claimants can benefit from the contrast with a group of obviously perfidious other claimants, through the creation of a binary opposition
between "good" recipients and "bad" ones. The clearest manifestation of this process in the September 11th case is the flurry of interest
in fraudulent claims after the introduction of the grid. 29 2 As claimants
from locations other than Buffalo learned in 1816, the existence of
fraudulent claimants who had "shamefully and scandalously plun290. Newshour: Compensation Fund (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 11, 2003).
291. GOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 44.
292. Dan Barry, No CatastropheIs off Limits to Fraud,N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at L Susan Saulny & David Chen, Woman Faces New Charges of Falsely Obtaining 9/11
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at B7; Robert Worth, 17 Are Charged in Theft of September 11
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at B2; Robert Worth, A Nation Challenged: Fraud; 25 People
Charged in Schemes To Obtain 9/11 Charity Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at A16; Edward
Wyatt, More Arrests Made in 9/11 Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at D6.
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dered" the treasury, as Virginia Republican John Randolph fumed in
1817, were great assets in defending the moral status of "true" claimants because they were obviously practicing deception in the service
of greed and, hence, can absorb much of the taint-leaving others relatively free to enjoy the spoils.
Finally, claimants can attempt to hold on to their victim status even
past the point of compensation, by asserting that the relief does not
actually fully make up for their loss. If the proffered relief is not sufficient to make claimants whole, then there is a residue of victimhood
that persists after the moment of compensation, and that is therefore
available to counterbalance the discrediting fact of having been compensated at all. This is a subtle but nonetheless extremely common
strategy, perhaps because it is always possible to point to losses beyond those reckoned by relief administrators (including having to go
through the relief process at all). For example, the Niagara claimants
in their memorials to Congress repeatedly pointed to whole species of
loss for which they were not seeking compensation:
[T]he extraordinary personal sufferings to which they had been
subjected, during the whole period of the war, by their local situation; not an indemnification for the loss of their time, in three years
suspension of their ordinary pursuits of business, not a redress for
the inconveniences of having their fields, their gardens, and their
houses the common thoroughfares of soldiers of every description
293

This strategy can also be seen in the repeated assertions by September 11th claimants that no amount of money could compensate for the
loss of their family members, particularly in the tragic and highly public collapse of the World Trade Center towers. Of course, statements
like these are at one level simple expressions of grief-no amount of
money can truly replace a lost spouse or child. At another, these assertions take issue with a basic tenet that runs through the history of
American disaster relief: that payment is intended to fully compensate loss, and hence to achieve "closure" by restoring victims to their
prior status. In doing so, victims thereby lose further claims on the
sympathies of the body politic (and become, as I have argued, recipients instead). Pointing to a loss greater than the amount of compensation challenges this basic logic, but in the particular service of
forestalling the identity transformation I have discussed. (It also, incidentally, provides a frame of reference by which the amount of com293. Petition of Pliny A. Field and Others, Niagara Sufferers, in Fred Manning Collection,
NARA. RG 217, Box 17, Folder 3: Claims, War of 1812
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pensation, no matter how large in absolute terms, appears small in
relation to the actual loss and hence less discrediting of claimants.)
VI.

CONCLUSION:

THE POLITICS OF COMPENSATION

The parallels that I have sketched between the politics of compensation following the War of 1812 and after the attacks of September
11, 2001, illustrate the persistent moral economy that has governed
the response to loss and need for virtually the entire period of the
American state. In this moral economy, loss alone is not a sufficient
cause for compensation from the national treasury. As my prior work
demonstrates, the moral logic of relief requires that claimants represent themselves as blameless victims of forces entirely beyond their
own control. Unsuccessful claims are those for which this narrative of
blamelessness collapses into an account of self-interest and will, in
which claimants can be held responsible for their own conditions.
If compensation for loss requires this narrative of blamelessness,
the period after the event but before payment is made is fraught with
potential for undermining the authorizing narrative. This is not only,
as one might expect, because there are external factors, such as cooling passions among supporters of relief, other distractions and claims
on funds, and so on. Rather, the spoiling of the identity of the claimants is intrinsic to the compensation process itself. As compensation
becomes more certain, the identity of claimants as recipients becomes
more salient, and they are, paradoxically, less fit to receive public
funds without being subjected to scrutiny, skepticism, and moral
doubt. The limit in this regard is, of course, public welfare, which has
built into a large-scale bureaucracy of distrust and moral opprobrium
the impulses represented by Congress's restraint of Lee's authority
and Feinberg's adoption of the grid as an objective measure of loss.
We need only consider the position of welfare recipients, whose transformation from victim to recipient is total, to see why the September
11th claimants are so eager to resist bureaucratization, and why Kenneth Feinberg has been so concerned to maintain some distance between himself and the victims' families.

